Frankenstein\u27s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures by Fisch, Jill E.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 3 Article 3
Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:
An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political
Expenditures
Jill E. Fisch
Copyright c 1991 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate
Political Expenditures, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 587 (1991), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/
vol32/iss3/3
FRANKENSTEIN'S MONSTER HITS THE CAMPAIGN
TRAIL: AN APPROACH TO REGULATION OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL EXPENDITURES
JILL E. FISCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since states began to grant corporate charters, the corporate
form. has been viewed by many with suspicion and distrust.
Corporations have been perceived as dangerous because of their
size, their ability to concentrate the power to control large amounts
of capital in the hands of a few managers, and their influence on
the lives of most citizens through control of consumer, investment,
and employment markets. This fear of the corporate form, which
led Justice Brandeis to describe the industrial corporation as a
"Frankenstein monster,"' prevailed for many years and caused
states to impose limitations on the size, 2 powers, 3 and
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Cornell
University, 1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. I am grateful to my colleagues Michael
Malloy and Steve Thel for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this Article
and to Cindi Weissman and Gary Leibowitz for their research assistance.
1. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Statutes limited corporations to a certain amount of authorized capital. Under the
state corporation laws in effect in the mid-1800's, provisions limiting the capital stock of
a corporation to $100,000 or even less were common. See id. at 550-54 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
3. Before the adoption of modern corporation statutes, corporate charters were required
to contain a statement of the purpose for which the corporation was formed. This purpose
provision was generally viewed as a limitation on the corporation's powers; actions by
the corporation that were'outside the corporation's stated objectives were deemed ultra
ires, literally beyond the corporation's power. Stockholders or third parties could attack
such actions on the ground that the corporation had acted in an unauthorized manner.
For a discussion of the classical ultra vires doctrine, see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws
OF CORPORATIONS 5 184 (3d ed. 1983); Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American
Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1662-72 (1988).
The amendment of corporation laws to permit general purpose clauses, that is, charter
provisions that permit the corporation to engage in any lawful business, has virtually
erased the classical ultra vires doctrine. For example, see 5 102(a)(3) of the Delaware
Code:
It shall be sufficient to state . . . that the purpose of the corporation is to
engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized
under the General Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all
lawful acts and activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation,
except for express limitations, if any.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 102(a)(3) (1988). Most states adopted such modern statutes in the
mid-1800's. See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 555 n.27. In addition, most states have limited the
application of the ultra vires doctrine by statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 124.
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duration4 of corporations.
In spite of the warnings by Justice Brandeis and others about
the corrosive power of the corporate form, corporations gradually
gained acceptance and were given increased powers, including
the power to own other corporations, the power to make chari-
table contributions, and the power to invoke the attorney-client
privilege. In the 1990's, corporations have become an acceptable
business form for the large multinational business, the small shop
owner, and the public interest group. That is not to say, however,
that the historic fear of the corporate form has disappeared.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce' serves as a reminder that the "Age of
Corporate Mistrust" is not dead. In Austin, the Court upheld
against first amendment challenge a Michigan law prohibiting
corporations from making independent expenditures that support
or oppose a candidate for state political office.6 Austin represents
a significant cutback on the corporation's right to engage in political
speech. Previous Supreme Court decisions established that inde-
pendent expenditures constitute political speech and that corporate
political speech, like that of individuals, is protected by the first
amendment.7 Austin rejected neither of those principles, but con-
cluded that the Michigan statute was legitimate because the pro-
hibition on corporate political speech served a compelling state
interest: the interest in preventing the "corrosive and distorting
effects" of corporate speech on political campaigns. 8
Corporations have historically been subjected to greater res-
trictions than unincorporated entities. Nevertheless, the Court's
willingness to find an evil inherent in speech based simply on
the speaker's "corporateness"9 is troubling.10 More importantly,
4. In the early 1900's, many states limited the duration of corporate existence to
periods from 20 to 50 years. See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 555 n.29.
5. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
6. Id. at 1401.
7. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam).
8. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
9. The evil addressed by regulations such as the Michigan statute appears to be an
evil associated with the corporate form, not the political involvement of businesses in
general. Id. at 1418 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10. Equally troubling are Austin's implications for the first amendment protection of
group or associational speech. This issue was a primary subject of Justice Kennedy's
dissent in Austin. See id. at 1416 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the Court decided Austin in a vacuum, divorced from any consid-
eration of the special powers and limitations associated with use
of the corporate form." In determining that the Michigan statute
was "narrowly tailored" to its goal,12 the Court thus did not find
it necessary even to consider whether state corporation law, the
traditional method of regulating corporate conduct, might be a
more appropriate and less restrictive method of preventing the
evils perceived by the Michigan legislature.
This Article argues that the Court's decision in Austin is an
unjustified departure from case precedent. It surveys the policies
behind extending first amendment protection to independent
campaign expenditures. In so doing, the Article reviews the basis
for the Court's decision that campaign expenditures, both by
individuals and entities, constitute protected political speech and
reviews the Court's subsequent retraction from the reasoning of
its earlier decisions, a retraction that culminated in the Austin
opinion.
The Article then examines the effect of the Michigan statute
and its federal counterpart' 3-both of which virtually outlaw
corporate political speech in an election contest-on the policies
that the first amendment protects. It analyzes the reasoning
employed by the Court in Austin and explains how Austin devi-
ates from both the logic and the values embraced by prior
decisions. The Article reviews the interests advanced in support
of the regulation of corporate speech and considers whether a
ban on corporate political expenditures serves the governmental
interests of fairness and integrity in the electoral process. Finally,
the Article questions whether the statutory prohibitions on cor-
porate political speech are narrowly tailored to serve these gov-
ernmental interests.
The Article concludes that the outright prohibition of corporate
political speech is not justified and that the refinement of state
corporation law is a less intrusive and more appropriate way of
regulating corporate political speech. Based on the rationale that
corporate political speech adds to the open marketplace of ideas
protected by the first amendment, prohibition of that speech
cannot be considered a narrowly tailored means of addressing
11. See infro notes 226-51 and accompanying text.
12. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
13. The Michigan statute is modeled after a corresponding provision of the Federal
Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 5 441b(a) (1988). See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying
text.
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the evils that the Court has identified unless the Court analyzes
the existing framework of corporate regulation and evaluates the
ability of a corporate law approach to address those evils.
II. THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND -CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES
AND CORPORATE SPEECH
A discussion of the first amendment protection of corporate
political expenditures must start with Buckley v. Valeo, 4 the
leading case on the limitations that the first amendment imposes
on government attempts to regulate political speech.'5 In 1971,
Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),6 a
comprehensive set of statutes aimed at reducing corruption in
the political process. 7 FECA imposed numerous limitations on
14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. The Court has distinguished between political speech, which it said is at the "core
of the First Amendment," Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988), and other forms of
speech such as commercial speech, which it held to merit a lesser degree of protection.
See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) (the Constitution "accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression"); see infra note 76. In Buckley, the Court made it
clear that the statute at issue regulated core political speech: "[lt can hardly be doubted
that the constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
16. As originally enacted, FECA amended sections of titles 2, 18, and 47 of the United
States Code. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.); see
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 144 app. Subsequently, Congress amended and renumbered FECA.
FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1263; FECA Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475; FECA Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187,
93 Stat. 1339. FECA's prohibition of independent corporate spending in connection with
a federal election is currently contained in 2 U.S.C. S 441b (1988), which prohibits national
banks, corporations, and labor unions from making a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any election for federal office.
Before the adoption of FECA, corporations had been subject to varying restrictions in
connection with election spending dating back to 1907, when Congress enacted the Tillman
Act, which made it unlawful for corporations "to make a money contribution in connection
with any election to any political office." Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864
(1907). In 1925, Congress extended the Tillman Act's prohibitions to contributions of
"anything of value," id. ch. 368, tit. III, S 302(d), 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), and subsequently,
in 1947, to expenditures on behalf of candidates, Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, ch. 120b, S 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947). For a detailed review of the history
of congressional regulation of corporate spending in connection with federal elections,
see United States v. UAW- CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570-87 (1957).
17. The Court described FECA as "by far the most comprehensive reform legislation
[ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and
members of Congress." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 Sciting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831
(D.C. Cir. 1975)).
1991] CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDITURES 591
spending in connection with federal political campaigns.18 In par-
ticular, FECA prohibited 9 any person2 from making a contribu-
tion of over $1,000 to a political candidate2' and further limited
independent expenditures by any person in connection with the
campaign to $1,000.2 FECA thus imposed two different forms of
limitations on political spending: contribution limits and expen-
diture limits.P
Buckley involved an extensive challenge to FECA on the basis
that FECA's restrictions violated the first amendment right of
candidates and their constituencies to engage in (and hear) polit-
ical speech.24 The Court agreed that both contribution 25 and
18. The 1974 amendments to FECA also established the eight-member Federal Election
Commission (FEC) and vested it with primary responsibility for administering and
enforcing the statute. See d at 109.
19. Violation of the statute.was a crime punishable by imprisonment of not more than
one year, a fine of not more than $25,000, or both. 18 U.S.C. S 608(1) (Supp. IV 1970)
(current version at 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) (1988)).
20. "Person" includes "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation,
or any other organization or group of persons." Id. S 591(g) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(11)).
21. See ad. S 608(b)(1) (current version at 2 U.S.C. 5 441a(a)(1)(A)) ("no person shall make
contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in
the aggregate, exceed $1,000").
22. 18 U.S.C. S 608(e) limited aggregate expenditures by any person "relative to a
clearly identified candidate during a calendar year" to $1,000. Id. 5 608(e)(2) (repealed
1976). The statute defined expenditures relative to a "clearly identified" candidate as
those in which the candidate's name or picture was used or the candidate's identity was
"apparent by unambiguous reference." For current definitions of "independent expendi-
ture" and "clearly identified," see 2 U.S.C. 5 431(17)418).
23. FECA also contained a direct prohibition on contributions or expenditures by
corporations, a continuation of the restrictions described in note 16, supra. 18 U.S.C. S
610 made it unlawful for any corporation to make a contribution or expenditure "in
connection with any election to any [political] office." 18 U.S.C. S 610 (current version at
2 U.S.C. 5 441b(a)). The expenditure limitations of 5 610 were neither challenged nor
addressed in Buckley.
24. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
25. The Court distinguished expenditures from contributions in two ways. First, the
Court held that a contribution is only an indirect form of speech. Id. at 20-21. Although
the contribution indicates support for a candidate and his or her views, it indicates only
general support without articulating the basis for such support. Id. at 21. Moreover, the
Court found that limiting contributions would not diminish political dialogue because
candidates were able to acquire adequate campaign funds through public funding and
small contributions. Id. at 21-22. Second, the Court found that Congress had a compelling
interest in restricting campaign contributions: the prevention of corruption in political
campaigns, particularly the actuality and appearance of political quid pro quos or bribery
in connection with large contributions to a political candidate. Id. at 25. The Court found
that the possibility of such corruption was a valid justification for the regulation of
campaign contributions. I& at 26. Accordingly, although the Court found that limitations
on expenditures violated the first amendment, the Court upheld the corresponding
contribution limits as constitutional. Id. at 29.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:587
expenditure limitations implicated fundamental first amendment
interests.26 Importantly, the Court rejected the finding by the
court of appeals that the statute's provisions regulated conduct
rather than speech, a finding premised on the fact that campaign
expenditures involve the expenditure of money rather than speech
alone.2 The Court stated that a communication's dependence on
the expenditure of money does not itself introduce a nonspeech
element into the communication. 28
The Court then found that by limiting independent
expenditures2 to $1,000, the Act essentially precluded most in-
dividuals and groups from communicating in any significant way.
According to the Court, the expenditure limitations made it a
"federal criminal offense for a person or association to place a
single one-quarter page advertisement 'relative to a clearly iden-
tified candidate' in a major metropolitan newspaper."3'
The government attempted to justify the limitation on such
expenditures with the claim that the statute was aimed at pre-
venting corruption in political campaigns. 2 Although the Court
accepted this rationale to support regulating campaign contri-
butions,33 it found that a comparable threat of corruption was
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id. at 16-17.
28. "[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the
expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." Id. at 16.
29. "Independent expenditures" are those expenditures that are not coordinated with
a candidate or made at his or her request. The Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration described the concept of independent expenditures as follows:
"Independent expenditures" refer to sums expended on behalf of a candidate
without his authorization, as distinct from contribution of money, goods or
services put at the disposal of his campaign organization.
For example, a person might purchase billboard advertisements endorsing
a candidate. If he does so completely on his own, and not at the request or
suggestion of the candidate or his agent[,] that would constitute an "inde-
pendent expenditure on behalf of a candidate"....
However, if the advertisement was placed in cooperation with the candi-
date's campaign organization, then the amount would constitute a gift by
the supporter and an expenditure by the candidate-just as if there had
been a direct contribution enabling the candidate to place the advertisement,
himself. It would be so reported by both.
S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMiN. NEws 5587, 5604.
30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-40.
31. Id. at 40 (quoting 18 U.S.C. S 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1970) (repealed 1976)).
32. Id. at 25. The government also identified two "ancillary" interests served by the
limitations: equalizing the relative ability of all citizens to affect the election process and
curbing the "skyrocketing cost of political campaigns." Id. at 25-26.
33. See supra note 25.
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not present in connection with independent expenditures neither
requested by nor coordinated with the candidate:34
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well
provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed
may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement
and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will
be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from
the candidate. 35
The government also sought to defend the FECA expenditure
limitations on the basis that those limitations served the impor-
tant purpose of ensuring equality in the political process by
"equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influ-
ence the outcome of elections." In other words, limiting cam-
paign expenditures would prevent a wealthy individual or group
from "buying" an election. The Court gave little credence to this
argument, finding that the expenditure limitation was a virtual
prohibition on political speech." Equal speech is hardly the equiv-
alent of no speech; even if equalizing the relative influence on
an election were a valid legislative goal, simply preventing speech
is not a valid way to achieve this goal. The Court however, went
further. In a footnote, the Court appeared to reject the defen-
dants' position that the legislature could abridge the first amend-
ment xights of some persons to engage in political expression "in
order to enhance the relative voice of other segments of our
society."'
For the purposes of this Article, the primary significance of
the decision in Buckley is the Court's conclusion that independent
expenditures are protected political speech.39 Moreover, Buckley
34. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74-82. The Court also held that the statutory prohibition
applied only to those independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a particular candidate. Id. at 80.
35. Id. at 47.
36. Id. at 48.
37. Id. at 48-49.
'38. Id. at 49 n.55.
39. Id. at 48-49. Such a conclusion is far from obvious. Several commentators, including
Judge Skelly Wright (the court of appeals judge whose decision the Supreme Court
reversed in Buckley), have argued that spending money does not constitute speech and
is not subject to first amendment protection. See Wright, Money and the Pollution of
Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609
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addressed the statutory regulation of political campaign spending
without regard to the identity of the speaker. As such, at least
one issue in Buckley was simple: individual citizens 40 who were
subject to FECA's expenditure limitations clearly had a first
amendment right to engage in political speech. Indeed, partici-
pation by individual voters in the public debate about political
candidates is at the core of protected first amendment values.
As the Court observed in Buckley, "Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Con-
stitution."41
The holding in Buckley is not limited to individual citizens.
Groups, as well as individuals, possess a constitutionally pro-
tected right to engage in free speech.42 Indeed, the Court explic-
itly awarded first amendment protection to corporate speech in
its first consideration of the issue.4 Two years after Buckley, the
(1982); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
Indeed, to a certain extent, spending money to publicize one's political views may be
analogized to using a bullhorn in a public forum-it allows the views to be amplified so
as to reach a wider audience, but it does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas
directly. As the Court recognized in Buckley, however, it is virtually impossible to speak
audibly in modern society without spending money. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. A single
newspaper advertisement involves a greater expenditure of money than that permitted
by FECA. See supra text accompanying note 31. Similarly, printing and distributing a
newsletter or mailing that expresses one's viewpoint, hiring television or radio time, and
even telephoning individual voters to communicate views directly all involve spending
money. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. It seems naive to believe that one can "make a difference"
in the political process through the communication of ideas without spending money to
convey those ideas to the public.
40. Group participation in political dialogue raises an additional issue not present in
Buckley: Is the speech of a group subject to the same kind of first amendment protection?
Groups clearly have some first amendment rights. Indeed, the rights of association granted
to individuals may, by implication, result in protection of the actions of groups. Moreover,
the mere fact of an individual's participation in a group may enhance the quality of his
or her speech by rendering that speech more credible, more powerful, or seemingly more
legitimate. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (NAACP may invoke first
amendment rights); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936) (newspaper
corporation has a first amendment liberty right to free speech).
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
42. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("[E]ffective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association"); see also Button, 371 U.S. at 428 ("We think
petitioner may assert this right [of association] . . . because, though a corporation, it is
directly engaged in those activities, claimed to be constitutionally protected, which the
statute would curtail."). In addition, limitations on political contributions and expenditures
impact on protected associational freedoms. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
43. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
571 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
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Court decided First National Bank v. Bellotti,44 which held that
such speech was constitutionally protected. 45
Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute that prohibited busi-
ness corporations (for-profit corporations) from making contribu-
tions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing the outcome
of any ballot measure "other than one materially affecting the
property, business or assets of the corporation. '46 Plaintiffs, in-
cluding three Massachusetts business corporations, 47 sought to
spend money to oppose a ballot question dealing with a proposed
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution that would have
permitted the legislature to impose a graduated tax on the income
of individuals.48
In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the Massachusetts
statute unconstitutionally burdened protected speech.49 Although
explicitly declining to premise its holding on a finding that
corporations have a first amendment right to engage in political
speech, 0 the Court found that the Massachusetts statute
"abridge[d] expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect."5' The Court found that the ballot issue was a matter of
public importance, that the corporate speech had a capacity to
inform the public, and that the corporation's status as a corpo-
ration did not affect the public value of its speech:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It
is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
44. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
45. Id. at 795.
46. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977).
47. The three business corporations were The Gillette Co., Digital Equipment Corp.,
and Wyman-Gordon Co. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768 n.l.
48. Id. at 769.
49. Id. at 765.
50. The Court explicitly rejected the issue as being whether and to what extent
corporations have first amendment rights. Id. at 776-77.
51. Id. at 776. Rather than basing its decision on whether a corporation has a first
amendment right to engage in political speech, the Court in Bellotti focused on the value
of political speech, from whatever source, in the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 776-77.
Scholars have interpreted this approach to corporate speech cases as a realization not of
the corporation's right to speak, but of the public's right to hear. See, e.g., Schneider,
Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1246-52 (1986).
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public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.52
Accordingly, the Court had to use the strict scrutiny test in
its evaluation of the Massachusetts statute.5 Massachusetts prof-
fered two interests served by the statute: "the State's interest
in sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the
electoral process" and "the interest in protecting the rights of
shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by man-
agement on behalf of the corporation."' 4 In the Court's view,
neither of these interests justified the regulation. 55
The Court initially appeared to give some deference to the
State's first rationale for the statute, which deference reflected
a retreat from Buckley.5 Stating that this argument would merit
the Court's consideration if it were "supported by record or
legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened immi-
nently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating
rather than serving First Amendment interests,"57 the Court
concluded that the State had made no such showing. "[T]here has
been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in
Massachusetts."
The Court went on, however, to state that the mere ability of
corporate speech to influence the outcome of an election does
not make such speech improper; indeed, persuasion is the purpose
of political speech. 59 Moreover, the Court found that ballot meas-
ures do not present the same potential for corruption as election
52. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (footnotes omitted).
53. First amendment jurisprudence provides for evaluation of a statute that burdens
constitutionally protected speech according to the strict scrutiny test. This test allows
the statute to stand if a compelling governmental interest justifies the government's
interest in regulating the speech and if the statute is the least restrictive means of
achieving the governmental goal. Id. at 786. Commentators have suggested that strict
scrutiny is inappropriate in evaluating campaign finance laws and that courts should test
such laws with a more lenient analysis. See, e.g., BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective
on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1045 (1985).
54. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787.
55. Id. at 788.
56. In footnote 55 in Buckley, the Court explicitly rejected equalization as a valid basis
for rejecting protected speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (per
curiam); supra text accompanying note 38.
57. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
58. Id.; ef. infra note 207 (citing articles hypothesizing that corporate spending does
affect voting patterns).
59. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
596 [Vol. 32:587
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contests.6 Finally, the Court reaffirmed its statement in Buckley
that the first amendment prohibits restricting the speech of some
for the purpose of equalizing the relative voice of others, and it
condemned the paternalism espoused by this approach.61
The State's second proffered justification for the statute was
more a matter of corporate law than first amendment law. Ap-
pellees claimed that the statute protected dissenting shareholders
from the use of corporate funds in support of views with which
they disagree.6 2 The Court's response to this issue in Bellotti was
twofold. First, the Court noted that the corporation can engage
in many forms of political activity, including lobbying, suggesting
that the statute was highly underinclusive if the protection of
shareholders was its goal.6 Second, the statute contained no
exception for expenditures that were ratified by a shareholder
vote, rendering the statute overinclusive." The Court also alluded
to the body of corporate law through which shareholders presum-
ably have the ability to protect themselves against improper
expenditures by management, including election of directors,
protective charter amendments, the shareholder derivative suit,
and ultimately the sale of the corporation's stock6 5
In view of its finding that corporate political speech was subject
to first amendment protection, that the Massachusetts statute
burdened that speech, and that no compelling state interest
justified the statute, the Court held that the statute was uncon-
stitutional.66 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that this deci-
60. Id. ("The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections . . .
simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue."). The Coutt expressly stated
that the question of whether Congress or the state legislatures could constitutionally
regulate corporate spending in connection with elections was not before it. Id. at 788
n.26.
61. Id. at 790-92 ("[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibiity
for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.") (footnote
omitted). Accordingly, although the Court seemed to waver, its final analysis appeared
to be a reaffirmation of footnote 55 in Buckley. See supra text accompanying note 38.
62. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-93.
63. Id. at 793. Indeed, the freedom of corporations to engage in lobbying raises broader
questions. Corporate political advertising is, at a minimum, readily ascertainable as such
by the public. Lobbying, on the other hand, takes place behind closed doors, leaving the
public unaware of the extent of influence that a corporation may be having on the political
process. Moreover, corporate spending on lobbying is substantial. See, e.g., IRS Admin-
istration of Tax Laws Relating to Lobbying, Part I: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 383
(1978) (business annually spends $1 billion on grassroots lobbying).
64. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794.
65. Id at 794-95.
66. Id. at 795.
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sion was contrary to principles of corporate law. Specifically,
Rehnquist observed that corporations are creations of state law,
empowered with only those rights conferred by their creators:
"'Being the mere creature of law, [a corporation]- possesses only
those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.' "67 If then,
the State wishes to create' corporations that lack the power to
engage in political speech, it should be free to do S0.68
The majority opinion did not directly address Rehnquist's ar-
gument because that opinion did not reach the broad question of
whether corporations have a first amendment right to engage in
political speech. Rehnquist's argument has two flaws, however.
First, the Massachusetts statute was a campaign finance law, not
a part of the state corporation law. As such, the statute did not
attempt to limit the powers of Massachusetts corporations to
engage in political speech. Nor was the statute a general prohi-
bition or limitation on corporate powers; rather, it singled out a
particular circumstance in which it prohibited the exercise of
powers that such corporations, in general, legally possessed.
Second, because the Massachusetts statute was not part of the
state corporation law, it applied to corporations doing business
in Massachusetts, not merely to those incorporated in the state.69
67. Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
68. Id. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. In general, the law of the state of incorporation determines the powers of a
corporation. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, S 86, at 160. This principle is known
as the "internal affairs doctrine" and provides that the law of the state of incorporation
determines internal matters of corporate governance, such as voting rights, powers, and
the validity of charter provisions. Id. "[A] corporation-except in the rarest situations-
is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the
corporate law of the State of its incorporation." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987) (upholding Indiana antitakeover statute based on finding that it
applied only to corporations incorporated in Indiana). The principle is one of conflicts of
law as well as logic: a corporation subject to the corporation laws of more than one state
might be subject to conflicting demands. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46
(1982). Other states must accept the powers that the laws of a corporation's state of
incorporation grant to it. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 U.S. 519, 588 (1839).
Although the internal affairs doctrine has no concrete basis in constitutional law, both
scholars and courts have recognized some constitutional limitation on the ability of a
forum state to apply its domestic corporation law to an out-of-state corporation. They
have attributed this limitation to the commerce clause, the full faith and credit clause,
and the due process clause. See Beveridge, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: The Proper Law
of a Corporation, 44 Bus. LAw 693, 709-15 (1989). Although a number of states have
passed "foreign corporation laws" which attempt to regulate at least some of the internal
affairs of out-of-state corporations, these statutes apply only if the corporation does a
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Its prohibition thus extended to corporations that Massachusetts
had not created and over which it lacked the type of creator's
authority contemplated by Rehnquist.
The Bellotti decision was controversial.7" One reason for this
controversy was that, in spite of the Court's clearly articulated
basis for its holding, Bellotti seemed to establish a corporation's
first amendment right to engage in political speech.71 Actually,
the decision did not go so far. The objections to Bellotti are
significant, however, because they are relevant to the broad issue
the Court eventually reached in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Comerce:72 the validity of statutory prohibitions on corporate
expenditures in connection with a political campaign.
Commentators raise three principal objections to extending
first amendment protection to corporate political speech. The
first argument contends that corporate speech is an illusion.73
The corporation as an entity cannot speak at all; it is an artificial
being. Many therefore suggest that the corporation has no first
amendment right to speak because corporate speech does not
exist. Such speech is simply the speech of the corporation's
managers.
The legitimacy of a corporation's first amendment free speech
right is a troubling challenge to Bellotti. The literature is filled
with discussions of the validity of granting to corporations first
amendment rights in general and political speech rights in par-
ticular.7 4 Although a review of this literature is beyond the scope
of this Article, the denial of first amendment protection to cor-
porate speech raises a number of troubling issues, including the
implication of the associational freedoms of individuals.75
majority of its business in the state, and they generally exempt corporations whose
shares are listed on a national exchange. These provisions therefore do not govern large,
publicly held corporations. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE S 2115 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1320 (McKinney 1986).
70. The commentary on the Bellotti decision includes Fox, Corporate Political Speech:
The Effect of First National Bank v. Bellotti on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67 KY.
L.J. 75 (1978-79); Hart & Shore, Corporate Spending on State and Local Referendums: First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 808 (1979); Schneider, supra note 51.
See also Garrison, Corporate Political Speech, Campaign Spending, and First Amendment
Doctrine, 27 Am. Bus. L.J. 163, 178 n.91 (1989) (citing additional scholarly commentary).
71. See, e.g., Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment: A Commentary
on First National Bank v. Bellotti, 38 WASE. & LEE L. REv. 21, 22 (1981) (describing the
corporation as a constitutional person with first amendment rights).
72. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
73. See Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 653 (1990).
74. See supra note 70.
75. Some of the most difficult problems associated with denying a corporation the right
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Moreover, if corporations do have some first amendment right
to free speech, why should that protection not extend to political
speech? One need not view corporate political speech as distinct
from commercial speech, the general body of corporate speech
which courts have previously held is subject to first amendment
protection. 76 Indeed, one can argue that corporate speech is, by
definition, always commercial speech 77 in that legitimate corpo-
to free speech result from the fact that many nonprofit organizations for which political
speech is a fundamental aspect of their raison d'etre, including organizations with a direct
political agenda, are organized in the corporate form. A limitation on corporate speech
thus affects not merely IBM and AT&T, but also the NAACP, the NRA, Common Cause,
and Planned Parenthood. Preventing these organizations from communicating the ideas
that they were formed to further is a direct restriction on the associational freedom of
their members. It is also a limitation on the ability of those members to communicate
effectively. The organizations cited above provide examples of the undeniable fact that
group speech is frequently more powerful than individual speech because of the ability
of the group to aggregate popular and financial support.
76. Although subject to first amendment protection, courts have given commercial
speech less protection than political speech. See supra note 15. Rather than employing
traditional strict scrutiny, the Court has developed a four-part test for applying the first
amendment to commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Justice Brennan termed the standards the Court should
apply to government regulation of commercial speech "relaxed." Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 351 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a comparison
of this test with strict scrutiny, see Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of.
Liquor and Cigarette Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 637 n.27 (1985). Furthermore,
in order for commercial speech to be constitutionally protected, it must be truthful and
concern lawful activity. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; see also
Zaudedrer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 658 (1985); Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 387-88 (1973).
The Court has justified the lesser protection given to commercial speech on the basis
that commercial speech is more "durable"; that is, intrusive government regulation will
be less likely to chill or inhibit it. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). The commercial nature of the
speech is not, however, a sufficient basis for banning it, and the Court has stated that
legislation cannot ban commercial speech that is truthful and not misleading, even though
the speech may have as its only objective the sale of goods or services, because it
nonetheless conveys information. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
77. The line between commercial speech and political speech is not particularly bright.
First, the fact that speech is motivated by pecuniary motives or takes the form of an
advertisement does not automatically make it commercial speech. As one commentator
has observed, "[Elven the most core political speech can be impelled by a jumble of
inseparable motives. Greed, Glory, the Greater Good: each informs the senator on his
stump, the preacher in his pulpit, the car dealer in his commercial." Note, "New and
Improved'" Procedural Safeguards for Distinguishing Commercial from Noncommercial
Speech, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1821, 1837 (1988) (footnote omitted). Nor does speech that deals
with issues of public concern automatically become noncommercial. The tobacco industry
has been vocal in discussing the connection between cigarette smoking and illness.
Similarly, the egg industry has recently attempted to address the public's growing concern
about the link between consumption of eggs and heart disease. See id. at 1838-39; see also
Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372, 386
(1979).
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rate speech is designed to further the corporation's objectives,
which, for a business corporation, should primarily be achieving
a profit 8 Nevertheless, is it reasonable to find that a state may
ban corporate speech altogether absent a compelling state inter-
est? Even in the area of advertising, it is clear that publication
of the corporation's speech is a contribution to the marketplace
of ideas.79 This leads to the same conclusion that the Court
reached in Bellotti: corporate political speech may legitimately
be entitled to first amendment protection because of the value
of the speech,8 rather than the rights of the speaker.8'
78. The notion that management's conduct is substantially constrained by the require-
ment that management adhere to a goal of profit maximization is clearly simplistic. See
Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1309-12
(1984) (corporate management's responsibility to shareholders has been reduced to a
"slogan" of profit maximization that fails to operate as a real constraint on management
authority). Even if management is assumed to act in good faith, its attempts to maximize
profits may be hampered by problems of inadequate information, subjective values that
differ from those of its stockholders, differing time frames, and the difficulties in
distinguishing personal from professional motivations. See Mundheim, A Comment on the
Social Responsibilities of Life Insurance Companies as Investors, 61 VA. L. REv. 1247 (1975)
(arguing that the profit maximization model is too permissive with respect to many
management decisions and too restrictive with respect to corporate attempts to be
socially responsible).
79. The theory that the first amendment protects speech because of its contribution
to the marketplace of ideas is generally attributed to Justices Holmes and Brandeis. See,
e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. As appellants argued to the Court in Bellotti,
A voter in Massachusetts, concerned with such economic issues as the tax
rate, employment opportunities, and the ability to attract new business into
the state, might be just as interested in hearing [a corporation's views on a
proposed tax] as say the views of. . .the editorial staff of the Boston Globe
on this same subject.
Brief for Appellants at 42, First Nat'1 Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (No. 76-1172).
81. Three purposes underlie the first amendment protection of speech. See, e.g., Note,
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission: The Right to Hear in Corporate
Negative and Affirmative Speech, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1081-82 (1988). First, free
speech furthers the objectives of the speaker through personal expression or self-
actualization. Second, speech protects the democratic system, including the communication
of minority viewpoints. Third, the first amendment serves as a tool to further the free
exchange of ideas; through expression of ideas, the public will become more completely
and truthfully informed. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1980); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
Scholars have identified this third purpose as the foundation of the holding in Bellotti.
See L. TRME, AMEmiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 12-1, at 795 (1988). Although a corporation
arguably has an interest in speaking, particularly when speaking increases its profits,
the public has a separate interest in that speech, which has been termed the right to
hear. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 51, at 1246. Commentators have justified the first
amendment protection of this right to hear on the theory that regardless of whether a
corporation has a "self' or any interest in self-expression, the corporation's speech
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The second principal objection to extending first amendment
protection to corporate political speech, an objection raised in
Bellotti, is that allowing a corporation to engage in political speech
infringes upon the first amendment rights of its stockholders,
who may disagree with that speech. 2 According to this argument,
corporate political speech forces the stockholders of a corporation
to associate with and to sponsor a political view they may not
share. Stockholders, however, may disagree with other corporate
practices, such as the corporation's hiring policies, its advertising,
its choice of research and development projects, or even its
charitable donations."' The structure of the corporation is de-
signed to permit the directors and officers to manage the cor-
poration's day-to-day pperations, regardless of the popularity of
management decisions. If such decisions are consistently objec-
tionable, stockholders can replace management through their
voting power. Moreover, if an individual stockholder strongly
disagrees with management policies, the stockholder has a readily
available remedy: to sell the stock of the offending company.
Finally, commentators argue that corporations have too much
money and that states have a valid interest in controlling the
disproportionate influence that corporations can wield on the
election process. Indeed, in recent years, a substantial body of
scholarship has debated whether the influence of monied inter-
enhances the public's ability to become informed. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777) ("[Tjhe inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source."). Some commentators have taken the position that the
only justification for granting first amendment protection to corporate speech is the
public right to hear. See, e.g., Note, Integrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti
Right to Hear-Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 72
CORNELL L. REV. 159, 187 (1986) ("The right to hear provides the sole first amendment
protection for a commercial corporation's speech . ... ").
82. See Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amend-
rnent, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294 (1981); Mayer, supra note 73, at 653.
83. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 467-69, 170 N.W. 668, 671 (1919)
(stockholder challenge to corporation's charitable donation policy). Recent challenges to
the practice of many large corporations of making donations to Planned Parenthood have
focused renewed attention on corporate philanthropic policies that do not reflect the
opinions of the corporations' constituencies, including customers as well as stockholders.
See, e.g., McDonough, Pro-lifers seeking corporate boycotts, Wash. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, at
A3, col. 1 (pro-life group calls for boycott of corporations, including American Express,
that give money to Planned Parenthood); Swisher, Backing Away From Controversy;
Abortion Issue causes AT&T to Pull Funds, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1990, at El, col. 4 (AT&T
announces that it will stop donations to Planned Parenthood due to pressure from
antiabortion forces); see also Cahill v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 76 N.Y.2d 102, 114, 556 N.E.2d
133, 138, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (1990) (upholding customer's first amendment challenge
to public utility's corporate charitable contributions).
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ests, such as corporations, on the electoral process is harmful.
Many scholars have advocated campaign finance reform both to
limit the overall influence of money in elections and to prevent
money from rendering certain voices particularly influential in
the political process.a
Based on the holding in Buckley that FECA's limitations on
independent expenditures were unconstitutional and the conclu-
sion in Bellotti that corporate political expenditures were entitled
to first amendment protection despite the identity of the speaker,
one might have concluded that section 441b of FECA, which
prevents corporations from making independent expenditures in
election contests, was unconstitutional.8 5 Yet for almost twenty
years, no Supreme Court case dealt explicitly with the legality
of such independent expenditures.86
84. See, e.g., Nichol, Money, Equality and the Regulation of Campaign Finance, 6 CONST.
COMIENTARY 319 (1989). The fundamental issue may be whether money and the corre-
sponding influence money can buy should have any role in the political process. To some.
extent, the Court's decision in Buckley thwarted the congressional attempt to minimize
the role of monied interests in elections. Id. at 323. The merits of devising a system that
incorporates overall spending limitations need not be resolved here, for the limitations
dealt with herein do not prevent the use of money in the election process; they merely
prevent the use of funds by corporate entities. Indeed, the greatest impact of wealth on
the political process can be attributed to the growth of political action committees (PACs).
See, e.g., Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 491 (D.D.C. 1980), affd by equally
divided Court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (NCPAC collected more than $7.6 million in 1979-80 for
use in the 1980 campaigns). The emerging role of PACs in political campaigns is docu-
mented in H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION (1983) and E. DREW, POLITICS
AND MONEY (1983). See also Briffault, The Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980
Election, 84 CoLUm. L. REV. 2083 (1984) (reviewing H. ALEXANDER, supra and E. DREW,
supra).
Moreover, even the current restrictions on corporate expenditures present some ave-
nues of escape, such as when expenditures are made by corporate officers and directors
or by related noncorporate entities. See NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON GOV'T INTEGRITY,
THE MIDAS TOUCH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE PRACTICES OF STATEWIDE OFFICEHOLDERS 15 (June
A,989) [hereinafter THE MIDAS TOUCH] (limits on corporate campaign contributions are easy
to circumvent by making donations "through family, employees, clients or customers,
PACs, and so forth").
85. Read together, the two opinions have been described as the "'Magna Carta' 'for
corporate spending in the political process.:" Garrison, supra note 70, at 189-90 (quoting
Dorsen & Gora, Free Speech, Property, and the Burger Court: Old Values, New Balances,
1982 SuP. CT. REV. 195, 212); see Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Restrictions
on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REV.
945, 946 (1980) (recent Supreme Court decisions "cast serious doubt upon the constitu-
tionality of [FECAT'); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1, 171 (1978)
(footnotes omitted) ("Bellotti places in immediate question the constitutionality of several
federal and state bans on corporate political contributions and expenditures:').
86. The validity of S 441b and its predecessors was challenged on four occakions dating
back to 1947; in each case, the Court avoided reaching the constitutional question. See
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1975); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,
407 U.S. 385, 400 (1972); United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957); United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948).
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Although it did not address the constitutionality of the section
441b limitations on independent expenditures, the Supreme Court
addressed an attack on section 441b in Federal Election Commis-
sion v. National Right to Work Committee (NRWC).7 NRWC dealt
with the provisions of section 441b that regulate contributions
to corporations for political expenditures. Although the Court in
NRWC did not consider the expenditures themselves, NRWC
claimed that the portion of the statute under attack imposed
limitations that interfered with a corporation's associational first
amendment rights.8
The Court found that, although the statute implicated the right
to associate, this right was not absolute. Rather, the Court held
that two interests justified the regulation: (1) ensuring "that
substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advan-
tages which go with the corporate form of organization should
not be converted into political 'war chests' which could be used
to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the
contributions";9 and (2) protecting individuals who have paid
money into a corporation for reasons other than supporting
candidates "from having that money used to support political
candidates to whom they may be opposed."90 The Court found
these interests sufficient to justify the regulation.91
The opinion in NRWC went beyond simply evaluating the
contribution issue in the case. The Court reviewed the seventy-
five-year history of the regulation of corporate political contri-
butions and concluded that the gradual development of this
regulatory scheme was a reasonable response to congressional
perception that "the special characteristics of the corporate struc-
87. 459 U.S. 197 (1982). NRWC involved the provision of S 441b that limits a corpora-
tion's ability to solicit contributions for its segregated political fund to the corporation's
"members" only. Id. at 198. NRWC was a nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose
of opposing compulsory unionism and publicizing its opposition thereto. Id. at 199-200. It
had established a segregated fund in accordance with the statute. Id. at 200. The FEC
claimed that NRWC was violating S 441b by soliciting contributions too broadly-in effect
by soliciting contributions from anyone who "'evidence[d] an intention to support NRWC
in promoting voluntary unionism."' Id. at 202 (quoting National Right to Work Comm. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 665 F.2d 371, 373 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 459 U.S. 197 (1982)).
The case was therefore about FECA's contribution limitations rather than its expenditure
limitations.
88. Id. at 206-07. The court of appeals' decision in NRWC had held that the statute
infringed upon associational freedoms protected by such cases as NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963). See NRWC, 665 F.2d at 374-75.
89. NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id.
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ture require particularly careful regulation. 92 Although the Court
never considered whether the special attributes of the corporate
form were tied to this type of regulation in any way, or whether
treating organizations differently from individuals bore a reason-
able relationship to preventing corruption in political campaigns,
it concluded that the governmental interest in preventing cor-
ruption could be accomplished by imposing special restrictions
on the political contributions of corporations, unions, and other
organizations.9 3 Accordingly, it upheld the application of the stat-
ute to NRWC's activities.94
Although one can view NRWC exclusively as a contributions
case,95 the decision was clearly a movement away from the
decisions in Buckley and Bellotti. First, the Court recognized a
legitimate governmental interest in regulating corporate political
activities based solely on the actor's use of the corporate form.
Without identifying any connection between the corporate form
and the evils that Congress supposedly feared, the Court con-
cluded that it could infer such a connection from the longstanding
tradition of regulating the corporate form.9 Second, the opinion
distinguished Bellotti on the sole basis that Bellotti did not involve
a candidate election. The Court thus failed to acknowledge that
Bellotti had explicitly reserved the question of whether corporate
political speech in candidate elections raises the same first amend-
ment concerns as speech in connection with state referenda.
The Court reaffirmed constitutional protection for group polit-
ical speech in Federal Election Commission v. National Conser-
vative Political Action Committee (NCPAC),9 in which the Court
was faced with a challenge to the validity of 26 U.S.C. S 9012(f),
a provision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act.99
Under the Fund Act, a presidential candidate could elect to
receive public financing for his or her campaign.100 The Act,
however, prohibited independent political committees, such as
political action committees, from making independent expendi-
92. Id. at 209-10.
93. Id. at 210-11.
94. I&
95. The Court never addressed the issue of NRWC's expenditures from the fund or
the implications of its decision on constitutionally protected speech.
96. NRWC, 459 U.S. at 209-10.
97. Id. at 210 n.7.
98. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1988).
100. Id. 5 9003.
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tures of more than $1,000 to further the election of a presidential
candidate who had elected to receive such financing.1 1 The FEC
challenged a number of expenditures made by two political com-
mittees, NCPAC and the Fund for a Conservative Majority
(FCM),'02 to purchase radio and television advertisements to en-
courage voters to vote for Ronald Reagan in his 1980 presidential
campaign. 08
The Court upheld its commitment to the Buckley principle that
political expenditures constitute core first amendment speech.10 4
The Court also reiterated the distinction between contribution
limits and expenditure limits, affirming that although the former
present a threat of corruption through the traditional quid pro
quo of "dollars for favors," independent expenditures do not
present a comparable threat.05 In addition, the Court rejected
the argument that group speech constitutes "speech by proxy,"
the kind of indirect speech generated by candidate contribu-
tions.'06 Instead, the Court found that groups such as NCPAC
provided an opportunity for individuals to band together in order
to amplify their voices and allowed those of modest means to
participate meaningfully in the political process.'0 7 Accordingly,
the PACs' expenditures merited first amendment protection. 10 8
101. Id. S 9012(f).
102. Both NCPAC and FCM were corporations, and both were registered with the
FEC as political committees. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 490.
103. Id. The Court found that the expenditures were
"independent" in that they were not made at the request of or in coordination
with the official Reagan election campaign committee or any of its agents.
Indeed, there [were] indications that the efforts of these organizations were
at times viewed with disfavor by the official campaign as counterproductive
to its chosen strategy.
Id.
104. Id. at 493.
105. Id. at 497-98.
106. Id. at 494.
107. Id. at 494-95.
108. The Court went on to conclude that no sufficiently compelling governmental
interest justified the statute's restrictions on that speech. Id, at 497. The Court made it
clear that the type of corruption that justified governmental intervention in the political
campaign process was "quid pro quo" corruption: "The hallmark of corruption is the
financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors." Id. The Court then relied on the
conclusion it had reached in Buckley, "that there was a fundamental constitutional
difference between money spent to advertise one's views independently of the candidate's
campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign." Id.
Finally, the Court concluded that, even if the statute addressed the potential for
corruption presented by the large financial resources of the PACs, it was fatally over-
broad. Id. at 501. The statute applied to groups with limited resources as well as those
with multimillion dollar war chests, neighborhood discussion groups as well as national
organizations. Id. at 498. Accordingly, the Court held the statutory restriction on group
expenditures unconstitutional. Id. at 501.
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In striking down the statutory limitation on group speech, the
Court did not consider corporate speech directly. In fact, the
Court made clear that the validity of imposing expenditure lim-
itations on corporate speech in connection with candidate elec-
tions had not yet been addressed. 10 9 The Court warned that this
was not a "'corporations' case," even though NCPAC and FCM
were corporations, because the statute in question applied to all
group expenditures regardless of whether the group utilized the
corporate form."0 Accordingly, it was able to distinguish cases
such as NRWC, which, according to the Court in NCPAC, "turned
on the special treatment historically accorded corporations."'
The Court repeated the observation it had made in NRWC
that corporations present a plainly recognizable potential for evil
and that this potential justifies governmental "restriction of the
influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate
form.""2 The Court alluded to corporate participation in the
political process as an area in which "the evil of potential cor-
ruption had long been recognized."" 3 As in NRWC, however, the
Court never explained precisely what evil the use of the corporate
form presented; instead, the Court appeared again to be referring
to the historical distrust of the corporate form as justification
for its regulation.
The Court had *an opportunity to consider the question that it
had reserved in the Bellotti decision"4 in Federal Election Com-
mission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL).1 5 A non-
profit, issue-oriented corporation, MCFL challenged the
constitutionality of section 441b's restrictions on corporate inde-
pendent expenditures in connection with an election contest.
Specifically, prior to the September 1978 primary elections, MCFL
published a special election issue of its newsletter in which it
discussed the positions of various candidates for Massachusetts
109. "In Bellotti, of course, we did not reach, nor do we need to reach in these cases,
the question whether a corporation can constitutionally be restricted in making inde-
pendent expenditures to influence elections for public office:' Id. at 496.
110. Id. The Court repeated the observation it made in NRWC that "[iun return for the
special advantages that the State confers on the corporate form, individuals acting jointly
through corporations forego some of the rights they have as individuals." Id. at 495
(citing Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10
(1982)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 500-01.
113. I& at 500.
114. See supra note 60.
115. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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public office with respect to abortion."6 The newsletter included
the photographs of thirteen candidates described as having a
particularly strong pro-life position.117 MCFL distributed this
newsletter to its contributors, as well as to others whom it
viewed as sympathetic to the pro-life cause."" The corporation
spent approximately $10,000 to publish and distribute the news-
letter, all of which was taken from its general treasury funds."9
The FEC brought suit against MCFL, claiming that the pub-
lication of the newsletter violated section 441b and seeking a
civil penalty. 20 MCFL defended its actions on a number of bases:
it claimed that the statute did not apply to its conduct because
the publication was not within the statutory definition of prohib-
ited "expenditures"; that the publication was subject to the
exemption for press publications; and that if the statute did apply
to MCFL's conduct, the statute was unconstitutional. 21
The Court could have avoided the constitutional issue by hold-
ing that section 441b does not apply to the type of conduct at
issue in MCFL, but declined to do so. Rather, it held that the
publication of the newsletter was within the statutory definition
of "expenditures" and that the newsletter did not constitute the
normal publication of a regular newsletter or periodical.'2 Ac-
cordingly, the Court reached the issue of the statute's constitu-
tionality.
While reiterating the holding in Buckley that "[i]ndependent
expenditures constitute expression 'at the core of our electoral
process and of the First Amendment freedoms' "'1 and applying
strict scrutiny to the statute, the Court noted the long history
of regulation of corporate political speech, which regulation was
justified by the great wealth and "'special advantages which go
with the corporate form of organization.' "124 The Court acknowl-
edged legitimate governmental interests in regulating the polit-
ical speech of corporations, including preventing an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace and assuring that the
116. Id. at 243.
117. Id. at 244.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 243-44.
120. Id. at 244-45.
121. Id. at 245.
122. Id. at 249-51.
123. Id. at 251-52 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968), quoted in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam)).
124. Id. at 257 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982)).
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resources used for political speech reflect popular support for
those ideas. 125 The Court also expressed concern that corporate
political speech has the potential for "diverting" funds from
corporate treasuries to political purposes.126
The Court went on, however, to find that ,the application of
section 441b to MCFL did not implicate those governmental
interests. The Court distinguished MCFL from traditional busi-
ness corporations in three ways:' it was formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas and could not engage in
business activity; it lacked shareholders or other constituencies
who might be economically damaged by the corporation's political
activity; and it was completely independent of traditional -business
corporations.1as According to the Court, MCFL's resources re-
sulted from the popularity of its ideology, not its economic
success. MCFL's political speech, therefore, accurately reflected
the degree of popular support for its ideas and did not corrupt
the political process. Consequently, the Court rendered a nar-
rowly written opinion,129 in which it held that the statute could
not constitutionally be applied to this particular corporation.30
The implication in MCFL was that section 441b was constitutional
as applied to business corporations. The Court explicitly stated,
however, that it had not decided this issue:
We acknowledge the legitimacy of Congress' concern that
organizations that amass great wealth in the economic mar-
ketplace not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace.
Regardless of whether that concern is adequate to support
application of S 441b to commercial enterprises, a question not
125. Id. at 257-59.
126. Id. at 258 (citing Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385,
423-24 (1972)).
127. Id. at 263-64.
128. MCFL had a policy of not accepting funds from traditional business corporations.
Id. at 264. The FEC has taken the position that a single dollar of corporate funding
presents sufficient danger of corruption to bar independent expenditures by a corporate
advocacy group or association that receives such funding. See Advisory Opinion 1987-7,
Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5880 (Apr. 6, 1987).
129. "It may be that the class of organizations affected by our holding today will be
small." MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264.
130. Id. at 263. Subsequent courts have read the test promulgated in MCFL literally.
For example, the court in Federal Election Commission v. National Organization for
Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 435 (D.D.C. 1989), appeared to find the prohibitions of S 441b
applicable to the National Organization for Women's use of corporate treasury funds,
even though "less than 1% of NOW's overall budget comes from contributions from
corporations or labor unions:' Id. at 430-31.
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before us, that justification does not extend uniformly to all
corporations. Some corporations have features more akin to
voluntary political associations than business firms, and there-
fore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending
solely because of their incorporated status.131
III. THE AUSTIN DECISION
This was the state of the law that awaited the Supreme Court
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.132 The Court seemed
to have upheld regulation of independent political expenditures
by business corporations only implicitly, by recognizing a poten-
tial for evil in the use of the traditional corporate form. The
Court had never actually considered the regulation of expendi-
tures by traditional for-profit corporations in connection with a
candidate election.
In Austin, the Court considered a Michigan statute1 3 analogous
to FECA.'3 As applied to corporations, the Michigan statute, like
its federal counterpart,"" prohibited corporations from making in-
dependent expenditures in support of or in opposition to the
election of a candidate for Michigan office. Like FECA, the Michi-
gan statute also allowed corporations to establish separate political
funds' 3 that could make political expenditures and to support and
administer such segregated political funds, but the statute prohib-
ited corporations from spending their own treasury funds, either
directly or through the segregated fund, to support or oppose
political candidates. Violation of the statute was a felony. 37
131. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263.
132. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
133. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. S 169.254(1) (West 1979).
134. The Michigan statute was modeled after S 441b of FECA. See Austin, 110 S. Ct.
at 1395 n.1.
135. FECA makes it unlawful for a corporation or labor union "to make a contribution
or expenditure in connection with" any federal election. 2 U.S.C. S 441b(a) (1988). It
defines an "expenditure" as the provision of anything of value "for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal Office." Id. S 431(9)(A)(i).
136. Contributions to the fund may be solicited from the corporation's members,
stockholders, officers, directors, and executive and administrative employees. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. S 169.255(2)-(3).
137. Section 54(4) currently provides:
A person who knowingly violates this section is guilty of a felony punishable,
if the person is an individual, by a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or
imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both, or, if the person is not an
individual, by a fine of not more than $10,000.00.
Id. § 169.254(4).
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Although the statute did not apply to media corporations, it did
not exempt nonprofit corporations. 13
The statute was challenged by the Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, a nonprofit corporation whose objectives and purposes
include "promoting conditions conducive to economic develop-
ment, training and educating its members, encouraging the main-
tenance and observance of ethical business practices, and receiving
expenditures and making contributions for political purposes.'139
The Chamber of Commerce wanted to place a paid advertisement
in the newspaper in support of a candidate for the Michigan
House of Representatives. 140 Although it had a separate political
fund, the Chamber of Commerce sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief that would enable it to pay for the advertisement with
general treasury funds.' 4 '
The Supreme Court did not question the body of case law
holding that the expenditures in question, although made by a
corporation, constitute protected political speech.'4 Nor did the
Court retreat from its previous finding that restrictions on inde-
pendent expenditures constitute direct burdens on speech;'" it
accepted, without discussion, the prenuse that the Michigan statute
burdened protected political speech.'" Accordingly, the very ques-
tion that the Court had reserved in Federal Electwn Commssion
v. Massachusetts Citszens for Lsfe, Inc.'" was now before it. The
138. Michigan law excludes from the Act's coverage any "news story, commentary, or
editorial in support of or opposition to a candidate" by any "broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical or publication." Id. 5 169.206(3)(d).
Although the legitimacy of the media exclusion is beyond the scope of this Article, the
role of the institutional press in election contests might easily be described as "corrosive"
The press appears to wield considerably more power in the political process than any
single commercial corporation. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783, 784-85 (6th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
140. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396.
141. Austin, 856 F.2d at 785.
142. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396-97. The Court explained:
Certainly, the use of funds to support a political candidate is "speech";
independent campaign expenditures constitute "political expression 'at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.'" The
mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech
from the ambit of the First Amendment.
Id. at 1396 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968), quoted in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam)).
143. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
144. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396-97.
145. 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (plurality opimon) ("Regardless of whether that concern
is adequate to support application of § 441b to commercial enterprises, a question not
before us, that justification does not extend uniformly to all corporations.").
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Court's precedents required it to apply strict scrutiny to determine
whether the regulation of political expenditures by business
corporations 146 advanced a compelling state interest and, if so,
whether the statute was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.147
In support of the regulation, Michigan claimed that the special
structure of a corporation justified special regulation.'4 In partic-
ular, Michigan noted that state law granted corporations a number
of advantages: "limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treat-
ment of the accumulation and distribution of assets."'49 According
to the State, these advantages allowed corporations to "use 're-
sources amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace.' "0
The Court accepted this argument. 5' Terming the economic
wealth of a business corporation a "'political war chest,' ",12 the
Court found that the influence of such war chests was a form of
political corruption.' The Court noted that this was not the quid
pro quo type of corruption'4 recognized in Buckley v. Valeo,'5 but
rather "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas."'' According to the Court,
146. The Court found that the Chamber of Commerce, although technically a nonprofit
corporation, did not come under the narrow MCFL exclusion because, inter alia, its
membership consisted primarily of business corporations. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400;
cf. infra note 160 (nonprofit corporations do not present much risk of corruption).
147. This standard required the Court to determine whether the prohibition "burdens
political speech, and, if so, whether such a burden [was] justified by a compelling state
interest." MCFL, 479 U.S. at 252 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45).
148. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257).
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985)).
153. Id.
154. The Court had previously described the corruption addressed by FECA as "a
subversion of the political process [whereby] elected officials are influenced to act contrary
to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions
of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo:
dollars for political favors." NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.
155. 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam).
156. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397. Commentators had been suggesting for some time that
the Court's view of corruption in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), was
too narrow and that corporate political spending presented a serious and ascertainable
threat to the electoral process. See, e.g., Hart & Shore, supra note 70, at 809-10; Shockley,
Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence,
and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAmi L. Rav. 377, 383-85 (1985).
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the prevention of this type of corruption was a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify the Michigan statute.5 7
The Court then considered whether the statute was narrowly
tailored. First, the Court found that the Michigan statute did not
"impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate political spend-
ing" because of the provision that allowed corporations to make
expenditures through separate committees.158 The Court then
concluded that the statute was not overbroad as applied to
corporations that lacked "vast reservoirs of capital" because those
corporations too enjoyed the special advantages of the corporate
structure, which gave them the "potential for distorting the
political process."'159 After determining that neither the nonprofit
status of the Chamber of Commerce' 60 nor the statutory exemp-
tion of press corporations created constitutional difficulties, the
Court upheld the statute.16' State prohibition of independent
expenditures by corporations in an election contest does not
violate the first amendment. 62
IV. THE CoURT's REASONING IN AUSTIN
Even superficial scrutiny of the opinion in Austin reveals that
it stands in absolute contradiction to the principles set out in
Bellotti. Indeed, reviewing the Court's findings in Austin leaves
the reader with the conclusion that a state may limit, or indeed
ban, virtually all corporate speech, whether or not political in
nature and whether connected with an election contest, a refer-
157. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
158. Id.
159. Id. The Court never explained how corporations that lack those resources can
corrupt the political process. It simply observed that such corporations enjoy the "unique
state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries." Id.
(emphasis added). See infra notes 226-51 and accompanying text.
160. Austin's applicability to nonprofit corporations generated a dissent by Justice
Kennedy in which he argued that nonprofit corporations in particular presented none of
the risks of corruption at which the statute was aimed and that the burden on free
speech imposed by applying the Michigan statute to these corporations was substantial.
See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1416-26 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Federal law already imposes certain limitations on the political activity of nonprofit
corporations. A corporation organized in accordance with 26 U.S.C. S 501(c)(3) (1988) is
prohibited from making partisan political expenditures, whereas a corporation organized
in accordance with 26 U.S.C. S 501(c)(4) must primarily engage in activities that promote
social welfare rather than activities such as political campaigning. See Rev. Rul. 81-95,
1981-1 C.B. 332. In addition, all political expenditures by a S 501(c) corporation are subject
to a special penalty tax. See 26 U.S.C. S 527(f).
161. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398-1402.
162. Id. at 1401.02.
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endum, or simple lobbying. Austin thus stands as a marked
affront to the fifteen years of history that precede it. 16e Never-
theless, Austin neither overruled, questioned, nor explicitly nar-
rowed the Buckley and Bellotti decisions. Instead, the Court
justified its holding on rationales that it specifically rejected in
the prior decisions.'6
Apart from the apparent inconsistency of the Austin decision
with the Court's earlier rulings, an issue that goes more to
legitimacy than accuracy, the opinion leaves the reader with the
distinct impression that the Court has pulled something (perhaps
this new breed of "corruption") out of its hat. In Austin, the
Court seemed to be operating on the premise that there is
something inherently evil or dangerous in corporate political
speech, 16 5 whereas just fourteen years earlier the Court found
that political speech served core first amendment values, regard-
less of the identity of the speaker. 6  If it does serve such values,
by informing the public, communicating ideas, airing both sides
of controversial issues, or otherwise,67 a premise that the Court
did not reject in Austin, then a state can regulate (or ban) such
speech only if the regulation is supported by a compelling state
interest and if the regulation is narrowly tailored to support that
interest. 6
A. Compelling State Interests-A Closer Look
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to consider the scope
of the regulation at issue in Austin, a regulation analogous to
163. See supra notes 14-131 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
165. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
166. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976) (per curiam).
167. Section 441b may also be objectionable because of its chilling effect on a broader
class of political speech. The FEC has taken the position that the application of the
statute to "express advocacy," see Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986), is to be read broadly and has repeatedly brought
injunctive actions against advocacy groups that discuss the political position or voting
record of a politician in connection with issue-oriented communications. See, e.g., Federal
Election Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45,
48-51 (2d Cir. 1980); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp.
428, 430-32 (D.D.C. 1989). Although courts have refused to apply the prohibitions of §
441b to communications that do not "present[ ] a clear plea for action," Federal Election
Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987), the
FEC's continued attempts to apply § 441b whenever such communications mention a
political candidate threaten the national commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate on public issues, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
168. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396.
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that in FECA.169 Essential to the Court's holding in Austin was
its finding that the Michigan statute does not stifle corporate
speech entirely because the corporation still may make political
expenditures through a specially segregated fund.170 This finding
is insupportable. Although provisions that allow the use of seg-
regated corporate political funds grant management some ability
to engage in political speech, expenditures through a segregated
fund cannot in any realistic sense be speech attributed to the
corporation. 71 Independent political contributions, rather than the
corporation, have funded the corporate political fund's speech.
No logical or legal link therefore connects the needs of the
corporation and the issues upon which its fund may speak. Nor
are independent contributions to the fund linked in any way to
the problems for which the corporation's speech may be impor-
tant. At the outset then, what the Court was countenancing in
Austin was not a restriction on, but an outright ban of, corporate
political speech. 7 2
In Austin, the Court concluded that treating corporate political
speech differently based solely upon the identity of the speaker
is permissible. 73 This holding was premised on the "special ad-
vantages" that state law gives to the corporate form. 74 Justice
Scalia demonstrates one flaw in this reasoning in his dissent by
observing that although many associations and individuals receive
special advantages from the State,'175 case law specifically rejects
169. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988).
170. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398. The Michigan statute, like FECA, allows corporations
to establish a segregated political fund that may make political expenditures. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 169.254-.255 (West 1989). The fund may not spend money from the
corporation's general treasury, however, but may use only money that has been donated
separately to the political fund. Id. Moreover, the statute permits the corporation to
solicit contributions to the fund only from members, stockholders, officers, and directors,
rather than from the general public. Id.
171. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1409 n.* (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The corporation as a
corporation is prohibited from speaking.").
172. Cf. Nicholson, supra note 85, at 1010 (advocating a limitation on independent
expenditures by corporations "set at a level that permits corporate and labor views to
enter the marketplace of ideas without creating an incentive for corruption").
173. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1401-02. This conclusion is an interesting contrast to the
reasoning in Bellotti, in which the Court stated that the content of the speech, rather
than the identity of the speaker, was the relevant consideration. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
174. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
175. I& at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, incorporation is not a privilege
reserved for an exclusive few. Virtually any business can choose to incorporate. See H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, S 68, at 125-27. For a discussion of the "special
advantages" of the corporate form, see infra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
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the notion that the State can exact the forfeiture of first amend-
ment rights as the price for those advantages. 176 The Court's
holding, however, contains a second and more insidious problem:
its supposition that corporate speech is harmful precisely because
of the identity of the speaker.177
In order to arrive at its conclusion that corporate speech
presents the threat of corruption, the Court journeyed down an
interesting logical path. Step one on this journey was the Court's
finding that corporations present opportunities for the accumu-
lation of great wealth.178 Although this is true, many other indi-
viduals and groups also have amassed great wealth. 79 Buckley
specifically rejected the notion that legislatures can limit political
speech on the basis that, absent regulation, wealthy people will
speak too loudly.8 0
Moreover, the regulation at issue is tied to corporate speech,
not speech by those with great wealth. The Court itself noted
that "the mere fact that corporations may accumulate large
amounts of wealth is not the justification for § 54."181 Most
corporations do not have large "war chests." Although some very
large corporations do exist, the vast majority of businesses uti-
lizing the corporate form are close corporations, which are rela-
tively small in size and number of shareholders and do not differ
significantly in their operation from sole proprietorships or part-
nerships. 18 2 Even if restraining the speech of the wealthy were
176. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
177. Id. at 1396-97.
178. See id. at 1398.
179. Nor is there an automatic logical link between large expenditures and corruption.
Even a small bribe is corrupt; a large and truly independent expenditure is not.
180. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
181. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
182. See, e.g., L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ, & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW & POLICY 7
(2d ed. 1988) (citing Statistical Abstract of the United States 516 (1985)); A. CONARD,
CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 100-01 (1976) (in 1981, fewer than 10% of United States
corporations had assets of over one million dollars, and in 1976, the median corporation
had assets of less than $100,000); UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 521 (Table 858) (in 1986, over 750,000 U.S.
corporations had gross revenues of less than $25,000); see also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 194 (6th ed. 1988) (based on 1970's data, 94% of all
corporations have 10 or fewer stockholders).
By contrast, Lloyd's of London and many large New York law firms present examples
of large powerful organizations that utilize the partnership rather than the corporate
form. See The Am Law 100, AM. LAW. 10 (July/Aug. 1989) (special insert) (reporting that
gross revenues of top 100 law firms for 1988 ranged from $52 million to over $440 million).
The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a particularly large and wealthy organi-
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valid, a statute that focuses on corporate status rather than
wealth is a highly inept tool for achieving that objective. 1s
Indeed, precisely this type of overbreadth justified overturning
the restriction on group political expenditures in Federal Election
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee.18
Apart from the limitations that the Court struck down in
Buckley, regulation of political speech has never been tied to the
speaker's wealth. Corporate status, on the other hand, has long
justified regulation of political speech. Why is that? The response
that the corporate form presents special risks of corruption or
social irresponsibility is too facile. Although much social regula-
tion-such as minimum wage laws, pollution control legislation,
and workplace safety requirements-has been designed to pre-
vent evils associated with big business, those evils are not limited
to business done in corporate form. A sole proprietorship sweat-
shop that employs children at starvation wages for twelve-hour
days is no less an affront to our social consciousness because it
is not a corporation. Accordingly, it too is subject to laws that
prohibit such conduct.
By contrast, laws such as FECA and the analogous Michigan
statute18 regulate the corporate speaker qua corporation. They
do not apply to businesses organized in another form. It is
therefore necessary to reflect directly on the corporate status to
ascertain what makes corporate speech in particular a special
form of evil. The Court addressed this question in the second
step of its corruption analysis by finding that corporate speech
is "unfair."'
What exactly did the Court mean by unfair? Did it mean that
corporations should not be permitted to engage in political speech
because they do not have a valid interest in influencing political
elections? Clearly some political issues and candidate elections
zation that is structured as an unincorporated association. See National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988).
Moreover, as Justice Scalia explained, a legislature could readily tailor a statute to
address the problem of polititil speech by corporations that possess great wealth, either
by prohibiting "independent expenditures above a certain amount, or. . . by limiting the
expenditures of only those corporations with more than a certain amount of net worth
or annual profit:' Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. As Scalia observed in his dissent, the Court explicitly found wealth-based restric-
tions on independent campaign expenditures to be unconstitutional in Buckley. Austin,
110 S. Ct. at 1409-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).
184. 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985).
185. MICH. Comn'. LAws ANN. S 169.254-.255 (West 1989).
186. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
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materially affect a corporation's business, and a corporation may
take a legitimate interest in them; international trade barriers,
commercial rent control, and parental leave legislation are a few
issues that come to mind. Recall also the Massachusetts statute
challenged in Bellotti, which specifically excluded from its expen-
diture ban referenda involving issues that materially affected a
corporation's business.187 Moreover, state corporation law bars a
corporation from making political expenditures unless those ex-
penditures further its business objectives. A corporate officer
who authorizes expenditures in support of his favorite political
candidates is guilty of wasting corporate assets unless those
expenditures benefit the corporation as well.
If a corporation has valid reasons to engage in political speech,
why is its speech unfair? One might argue that because a cor-
poration cannot vote and is not a part of the democratic process,
allowing the corporation to attempt to influence the vote is
unfair.' 88 The right to speak, however, is not limited to those
who can vote. Aliens, minors, citizens of other states, and con-
victed felons are all allowed to air their political views in an
attempt to influence the votes of others. Free speech is not
reserved for those qualified to vote. Indeed, one of the attributes
of political speech is its ability to convey the needs of those
whom the political process does not fully represent, so that a
voter can consider a candidate's position on children's rights,
prison overcrowding, or corporate income tax. Moreover, one
component of the first amendment is the protection of the right
to hear.8 9 The first amendment protects political speech not
simply because the speaker is entitled to speak, but also because
the listener is entitled to hear. 90
Corporate political speech seems no less fair than anyone else's
speech merely because it issues from a corporation. MCFL's
187. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1978) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 55, S 8 (West Supp. 1977)). The exclusion implied that the Massachusetts
legislature found that some referendum issues materially affect a corporation's business.
188. See Schneider, supra note 51, at 1270 ("[A] more powerful inference from the
nature of democratic government is not that we protect people's right to speak because
they may say something useful, but that we protect their right to speak because they
have a right to govern.").
189. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 766
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1968).
190. One can appreciate corporate contributions to the marketplace of ideas merely by
reviewing the amici briefs filed in Austin by corporations, including the American Civil
Liberties Union, The American Medical Association, the National Organization for Women,
Greenpeace Action, and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America.
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newsletter that informed the public of various candidates' voting
records on abortion1 91 was no less informative because a corpo-
ration prepared it. The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce's
statement that it believed Richard Bandstra would support lower
regulatory costs and personal income taxes,192 issues that were
important for big business investment in the state, 93 was a
statement that was relevant to the Chamber's mission of pro-
moting state business interests.
Nor is corporate speech unfair because it is inherently wrong.
States regulate much corporate/business activity because of a
natural law view that certain activities are simply wrong. For
example, nineteenth-century railroad corporations were criticized
for not paying their workers a living wage. The railroads justified
their actions by claiming that they were in business to generate
profits for their stockholders and that paying workers a higher
wage than necessary to induce them to work would reduce such
profits. 94 As legislation later evidenced, American society held
the view that permitting businesses to pay workers less than it
was possible to live on for a full day's work was morally wrong,
even though such action appeared to be in the company's best
interests. 95 Accordingly, legislatures developed a variety of social
regulations to curb businesses' tendency to engage in wrongful
actions. These social regulations applied to all businesses, not
merely to the corporation.95
Is it inherently or morally wrong for a corporation to engage
in political speech' 97 if such speech furthers its business objec-
191. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
243 (1986).
192. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1427 app. (1990).
193. See id.
194. See generally I. STONE, THE ORIGIN: A BIOGRAPHICAL NOVEL OF CHARLES DARwIN
(1980) (detailing the legal struggle of the railroads and other big businesses against
reducing the profits to their stockholders by paying their workers higher wages).
195. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 5 206 (1988) (federal minimum wage law).
196. Cf. Schneider, supra note 51, at 1255 ("A central problem of modern law continues
to be the search for ways to control the corporation.").
197. One objection to corporate political speech is based on the argument that, because
a corporation is "soulless," no sense of morality constrains it to speak in a way that it
believes will further justice or good government. See Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question
of Corporate Moral Agency, 1988 CoLumI. Bus. L. REV. 683, 687-99 (corporation is not a
"moral agent," and therefore corporate speech distorts the dynamics of reason); see also
Schneider, supra note 51, at 1261 ("[Elven good people operating in large organizations
work under circumstances that can be unconducive to seeing and telling truth" because
"[tihere are ... pressures on the managers of large corporations which have nothing to
do with telling the truth, and these pressures are institutionalized and strong far beyond
those on most individuals."). One would be naive to believe that any substantial percentage
of noncorporate political speech is the result -of the speaker's desire to achieve objective
justice rather than goals of a more personal nature.
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tives? 9 8 Until the decision in MCFL, the primary evil associated
with excessive political spending was the risk of creating the
appearance or actuality of bribery. 99 Candidates whose elections
are funded directly or indirectly by wealthy individuals and/or
businesses may be beholden to those constituencies. This type of
corruption, in the Court's view in Buckley, justified the FECA
limits on political contributions. 20 0
198. Many categories of speech are objectionable and generate attempts to bar the
speech directly, either because it is offensive in that it is perceived as harmful to minors
or others or because it may generate violence or ill will. See, e.g., Lufkin, The Free Speech
Argument-Challenges to First Amendment may become the issue of the '90s, San Francisco
Chron., June 22, 1990, at B3, col. 1 (describing many areas in which controversial speech
has resulted in bar attempts, such as the sexually explicit song lyrics of 2 Live Crew,
racial slurs on college campuses, and the sexually and racially offensive comments in the
comedy routine of Andrew "Dice" Clay).
Although one may justifiably consider hateful speech, obscenity, and racial slurs to be
evil and lacking in any social utility whatsoever, most such speech is protected under
the first amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2407-08 (1990)
(declaring that "flag-burning constitute[s] expressive conduct" that "enjoy[s] the full
protection of the First Amendment"); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1989)
(holding statute prohibiting desecration of flag violated first amendment); How to Handle
Hate on Campus, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at A30, col. 1 (describing settlement of suit
between student and University of Connecticut for infringement of first amendment
rights after student was expelled for "hanging a handmade poster on the outside of her
door listing 'homos,' among others, as unwelcome"). In spite of their perceived evils,
hateful and other offensive speech cannot be regulated "'unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.'" DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1342,
269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 890 (1990) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). Clearly,
whatever threat of corruption corporate political speech presents, its regulation cannot
be justified on the same basis.
199. Commentators criticized the Court's "narrow" view of corruption, arguing that
the large sums of money spent on political issues caused corporate spenders to dominate
the political process, giving them undue influence and undermining public confidence in
the integrity of the democratic system. See, e.g., Shockley, supra note 156, at 384. It is
difficult to argue with the conclusion that wealth dominates the political process, but the
connection between corporate speakers and excessive spending is less obvious. See THE
MIDAs ToucH, supra note 84, at 1 (18-month study on political contributions in New York
state election process found that wealthy contributors -including individuals, partnerships
such as law firms, and businesses-have substantial influence on elections; "Wealthy
contributors easily dominate the fund-raising scene.").
200. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). The Court in Bellotti
distinguished this quid pro quo form of corruption on the basis that corporate spending
in connection with referenda did not implicate the specter of bribery. First Nat'l Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). Although real or apparent indebtedness of public
officials to special interest groups might justify restrictions on contributions, it is far
from obvious that independent expenditures present the same threat. As Justice Scalia
observed in his dissent in Austin, independent advocacy by a corporation is not necessarily
beneficial to a candidate's campaign and may well run counter to it: "I expect I could
count on the fingers of one hand the candidates who would generally welcome, much less
negotiate for, a formal endorsement by AT&T or General Motors." Austin v. Michigan
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A second type of corruption that we may associate with ex-
cessive political spending is the notion that money corrupts the
political process itself, resulting in "unjust" election results. Those
who would have absolute limits on political spending express this
view. The idea is twofold. First, to have expenditures for political
campaigns running into millions of dollars is not socially valuable.
Second, excessive spending tends to allow those with the greatest
wealth to buy acceptance of their ideas.201
Both of these viewpoints are valid, but whether they are
sufficiently compelling state interests to ban corporate political
speech is far from clear. First, as a matter of social utility, the
economic marketplace operates as a far more efficient limitation
on corporate political speech than do campaign finance laws. If a
corporation wastes a large amount of money on political speech,
it will hinder its ability to compete in the traditional business
markets and in the stock market. The cost to the corporation of
making political expenditures must be justified in terms of overall
economic benefit; that is, expenditures should result in lower
prices and higher profits- socially optimal results.2 2 Second, the
State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1410 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In addition, it appears that massive political spending may be more effective when
employed against a political candidate than when employed on his or her behalf. Studies
of political spending in connection with ballot proposals show that money is much more
successful in defeating such proposals than in ensuring their success. Lowenstein, Cam-
paign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the
First Amendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 505, 511, 542-47 (1982); Shockley, supra note 156,
at 393. If the same effect holds in election contests, corporate political spending poses
the greatest threat to incumbents. This reasoning may explain legislators' readiness to
enact campaign finance reforms that bar such spending.
201. Many scholars have suggested that the infusion of large amounts of corporate
funding into the political process has corrupted the process to the point at which
individuals are actually discouraged from participating. Limiting or equalizing speakers'
ability to engage in political speech, scholars argue, will enhance the quality of debate.
For a sampling of articles addressing the equalization argument, see BeVier, supra note
53, at 1046 n.5. Based on this analysis, they argue that the first amendment's purpose is
served by limiting or forbidding speech that" 'supplant[s], disrupt[s], or coerce[s]' politics."
Schneider, supra note 51, at 1270 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 63
(1975)); see also Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT.
L. REV. 519, 540 (1979) (suggesting that limitations on spending for "campaign speech"
are acceptable when they promote fairness). Professor Tribe makes the argument that if
FECA's restrictions have the effect of enhancing the quality of political debate, then
they actually enhance freedom of speech; accordingly, the strict scrutiny review the
Court has applied to the regulations, which is typically applied to abridgements of free
speech, is inapposite. L. TRIBE, supra note 81, SS 13-27, at 801-03.
202. Although one might argue that corporate political spending is an example of
market failure-a case in which the market does not deter wasteful spending by corporate
managers-the Court did not premise its decision in Austin on such a finding. As the
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paternalistic notion that corporate spending should be regulated
because otherwise large corporate spenders would be able to
"buy"203 the political system is unpersuasive. 2 4 Such a concept is
clearly contrary to the first amendment; the notion that speech
can be regulated on account of its ability to persuade is an
anathema to the Constitution. 205 More importantly, however, this
notion is implausible.20 6 Every day the average citizen views
examples of overwhelming corporate spending for the purpose of
persuasion in the form of commercial advertising. Although cor-
porations obviously advertise with the expectation that they will
succeed in persuading consumers, the tombs of television are
filled with the remains of expensive advertising campaigns that
failed, that did not persuade consumers to buy product "x"
Court observed in Bellotti, in cases in which first amendment issues are at stake, raising
the possibility of a threat is insufficient, and the Court must require concrete evidence
in the form of record or legislative findings before accepting the argument that an
outright prohibition is the most narrowly tailored means available. See Bellotti, 435 U.S.
at 788-90.
203. Even advocates of campaign finance limitations agree that the distinction between
speech that is persuasive and speech that is "dominating" is a difficult one. See Shockley,
supra note 156, at 388-89.
204. This is not to deny that wealth is probably the prime factor in obtaining access
to the electronic media that serve as the most important modern means for communication
of ideas. For example, commentators have harshly criticized the use of television adver-
tising in political campaigns as fostering a political process in which voters make their
decisions based on images rather than on issues. See, e.g., Note, Protecting the Rationality
of Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 892
(1984). Congressional concern about voter reactions to superficial political advertising was
one of the motivating factors behind the increase in the regulation of campaign financing.
See id. at 919 (citing legislative history of FECA). The role of television advertising in
the electoral process is a serious problem; it is, however, one that is tied to the overall
use of wealth in political campaigns, not to the participation by corporations in particular.
The role of wealth and the ability of those with wealth to obtain media access raises
social issues that go far beyond the debate over corporate political speech and that
implicate the role of advertising in political campaigns, the commitment of media time to
issues of public concern, and the role of the institutional press in policymaking. See
Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent (Book Review), 93 YALE
L.J. 581 (1984). For a chilling view of the impact that the institutional press can have on
political policy through the manipulation of the electronic media, see T. WOLFE, THE
BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987).
205. In Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), the Supreme Court rejected the view that
a paternalistic concern for the ability of voters to evaluate conflicting arguments justifies
limitations on speech. "'The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice
does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech.'" Id. at
426 n.7 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
206. Finally, this notion is impractical as a method of attempting to regulate speech.
If we may regulate excessive spending because it produces speech that is too persuasive,
what is the next step? Is it appropriate to prohibit political speech by sports heroes or
movie stars because they are "unduly" able to influence the public? See Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1416 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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instead of product "y." If the mere expenditure of funds does
not guarantee persuasive success in the sale of products, why
should such expenditure be any more of a threat in the sale of
politicians,20 7 an issue that presumably involves more than a
determination of which "tastes great" and which is "less filling."2 8
As Justice Scalia succinctly stated, "The advocacy of such entities
S." .will be effective only to the extent that it brings to the
people's attention ideas which-despite the invariably self-inter-
ested and probably uncongenial source-strike them as true. 209
207. A number of scholars have ascertained that corporate spending does have an
effect on voting patterns. See, e.g., Hart & Shore, supra note 70, at 819-21; Lowenstein,
supra note 200, at 518; Mastro, Costlow, & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate
Control of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do About It, 32
FED. COMm. L.J. 315, 319-27 (1980); Shockley, supra note 156, at 391-400. One should not
assume, however, that this effect was the result of corporate indoctrination. The effect
of corporate spending might as well be explained by the theory that corporate spending
addressed ideas not previously communicated to voters, ideas that were sufficiently
important to affect those voters' decisions.
208. The evidence suggests that pblitical incumbents are heavy favorites for reelection.
See NEW YORK STATE COMlI'N ON GOV'T INTEGRITY, THE ALBANY MONEY MACHINE: CAM-
PAIGN FINANCING FOR NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE RACES 24-25 (Aug. 1, 1988) (incumbents
in both state Senate and Assembly races are able to raise and spend significantly more
money than challengers in their campaigns); THE MIDAs TOUCH, supra note 84, at 6-11
(the high cost of political campaigns and the difficulty of achieving name recognition
makes incumbents heavy favorites for reelection); Note, supra note 204, at 927-28 (incum-
bents are able to raise more money and also use their present position to campaign more
effectively). In addition to their demonstrably superior ability to raise campaign funds,
incumbents have the advantage of greater visibility. An incumbent can appear on
television not just through his or her advertising campaign but also in connection with
political events.
Consequently, incumbent legislators, as a group, are most directly threatened by well-
funded corporate advocacy which may, as a practical matter, be in a far better position
to challenge the incumbent than the campaign of his or her adversary. Current legislators
have a substantial personal stake in removing such advocacy from the political forum.
Silencing the most influential potential opposition assures that the present legislators
will not become victims of "corporate persuasion."
209. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The persuasive power of corporate speech is not limited to political speech. Commen-
tators have suggested, for example, that tobacco advertising is largely responsible for
the use of tobacco, one of the leading causes of death in the United States. See Mayer,
supra note 73, at 614 nn.187 & 190. Battles to ban the advertising of tobacco (and alcohol)
have been controversial, but to date have failed to result in an absolute ban of such
speech, despite the claim that tobacco advertising is actually causing people to die. See,
e.g., Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1211-16 (1988) (citing studies demonstrating that advertising increases
the incidence of smoking); see also Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328, 348 (1986) (upholding legislative ban on advertising by gambling establishments); of.
Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1082, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (sus-
taining Federal Communication Commission's ban on cigarette advertising on television).
But see Note, supra note 76, at 633 (questioning the constitutionality of legislative bans
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In order to justify finding unfairness in corporate political
speech, one must turn to the third step of the Court's reasoning
in Austin. In step three, the Court explained that corporate
political speech is unfair because it does not reflect popular
support for the ideas expressed:
The resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . .
are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's
political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated
decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these
resources may make a corporation a formidable political pres-
ence, even though the power of the corporation may be no
reflection of the power of its ideas.210
The Court appears to be of the view that the first amendment
protects political speech based on popular support for the ideas
expressed. Even if this notion, which is contrary to two centuries
of constitutional law, were valid, it raises some interesting ques-
tions. Public support by whom? A corporation is not run on the
theory that specific management decisions are subject to stock-
holder review or approval. In fact, the opposite is true. The
delegation of management to the board of directors denies stock-
holders a role in corporate decisionmaking. 211 So long as manage-
ment acts on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the reasonable
belief that its decisions are in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, stockholder support for those decisions is irrelevant, and
the decisions are immune from attack, even in court.212
on liquor and cigarette advertising). The threat posed by advertising of liquor, tobacco,
and gambling is frequently articulated as the concern that advertising increases con-
sumption and that the state has a legitimate, albeit paternalistic, interest in limiting the
consumption of harmful substances. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 342
(accepting the view that advertising of casino gambling "would serve to increase the
demand for the product advertised"). Moreover, the Court has noted that regulation of
such advertising may be justified on the theory that its purpose is not to inform but to
mislead. For example, commentators have repeatedly criticized cigarette advertising for
distorting the dangers of smoking. See Lowenstein, supra, at 1219-23.
Despite the proven harmful effects of tobacco and alcohol and the evidence linking
advertising of these products with increased consumption, legislative regulation of such
advertising has been minimal. A comparison of the costs and benefits of corporate tobacco
advertising with those of corporate political advertising suggests that FECA's absolute
ban on the latter may be excessive even if such advertising has considerable persuasive
power.
210. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986)).
211. See, e.g., Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (1880) (statute
provides that corporation is to be managed by its directors, not by its stockholders).
212. Judicial deference for management decisions made in accordance with these
[Vol. 32:587
1991] CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDITURES
In Austin, the Court suggested that corporate speech with
which the corporation's stockholders disagree is the equivalent
of compelled speech by unwilling stockholders (or employees
indirectly).213 "Furthermore, because such individuals depend on
the organization for income or for a job, it is not enough to tell
them that any unhappiness with the use of their money can be
redressed simply by leaving the corporation or the union." 214 The
Court attempted to create a Catch-22 argument: a corporation's
constituencies who disagree with its political agenda may be
unwilling to withdraw from the corporation in order to disasso-
ciate themselves from that agenda. Nevertheless, if corporations
are allowed to make political expenditures, then such persons
have notice of this possible disagreement prior to becoming
associated with a corporation; arguably, their subsequent asso-
ciation indicates implicit assent to or at least tolerance of such
conduct. 215 Furthermore, political spending is not necessarily dis-
principles is known as the "business judgment rule." The business judgment rule presumes
that management is acting in. the corporation's best interests absent evidence of self-
dealing, conflict of interest, bad faith, or fraud, and the courts will not second-guess
management decisions. See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir.
1980); Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D.N.J. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). As the Third Circuit explained in Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981), the business judgment rule
"achieves ...[its] purpose by postulating that if actions are arguably taken for the
benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed to have been exercising their
sound business judgment rather than responding to any personal motivations." Courts
will apply this presumption as long as they can attribute managements actions to "any
rational business purpose." To overcome the presumption of regularity, a plaintiff must
establish more than mixed motives on behalf of management, but must show that
"impermissible motives predominated in the making of the decision in question." Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
(quoting Johnson, 629 F.2d at 292) (emphasis added by the court in Panter).
213. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399; see also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 260 ("such persons, as noted,
contribute investment funds or union dues for economic gain, and do not necessarily
authorize the use of their money for political ends"); Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (protection of persons who put money
into a corporation or union for reasons other than support of political candidate provides
sufficient justification for regulating such corporate expenditures); Pipefitters Local Union
No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15 (1972) (concern for protecting dissenting
stockholder or union member).
214. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 260.
215. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A shareholder implicitly agrees
that the corporation in which he or she invests may take any legal action authorized by
its corporate charter. By assenting to the corporate form, he or she waives the right
even to vote on (much less to veto) particular aspects of the corporation's operation. As
Justice Scalia observed:
Thus, in joining [a for-profit corporation], the shareholder knows that man-
agement may take any action that is ultimately in accord with what the
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tinct from the corporation's primary objective of seeking eco-
nomic gain. This is a major logical flaw in the Court's reasoning;
the opinion ignores the fact that corporations engage in political
expenditures precisely because management perceives those ex-
penditures as beneficial to the corporation.216 Otherwise such
expenditures are ultra vires. 217 If a corporation's stockholders
(and other constituencies) have authorized the management to
use all legal means to generate profits, then political expenditures
should not be materially different from any other profit-seeking
activity.218
Nor is there any justification for the Court's suggestion that
corporate speech should enjoy broad public support. The Court
quotes the argument from MCFL that the size of the corporate
treasury, and thus the corporation's potential for influence, is
the result of economically motivated decisions rather than sup-
port for the corporation's political views.219 The same is true,
majority (or a specified supermajority) of the shareholders wishes, so long
as that action is designed to make a profit. That is the deal. The corporate
actions to which the shareholder exposes himself, therefore, include many
things that he may find politically or ideologically uncongenial: investment
in South Africa, operation of an abortion clinic, publication of a pornographic
magazine, or even publication of a newspaper that adopts absurd political
views and makes catastrophic political endorsements. His only protections
against such assaults upon his ideological commitments are (1) his ability to
persuade a majority (or the requisite minority) of his fellow shareholders
that the action should not be taken, and ultimately (2) his ability to sell his
stock.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Cf. supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing Massachusetts statute pro-
hibiting most corporate campaign expenditures).
217. The Court could have based its decision on a finding that corporate political
expenditures are wasteful and do not further legitimate corporate objectives, a conclusion
that would have brought the Michigan statute within the class of provisions that regulate
waste. See Brudney, supra note 82, at 245-52 (arguing that corporate political speech is
waste and can constitutionally be regulated in the same manner as excessive executive
salaries). The Court, however, did not do so. Moreover, regulating corporate political
speech as waste would presumably permit a corporation to avoid the prohibition by
stockholder authorization or by a showing that the speech materially affected its business.
218. In addition, the statute prohibits corporate political speech even if a unanimous
shareholder vote has authorized such speech. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 794 (1978) (suggesting that applicability of Massachusetts prohibition in cases in
which "shareholders unanimously authorized" the speech constituted a significant flaw in
the statute). Even the prohibitions on corporate waste generally provide that unanimous
shareholder approval can "cure" such waste. See Brudney, supra note 82, at 249.
219. "'[ T ]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an
indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead
the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers.' " Austin, 110 S. Ct. at
1397 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 258 (1986)).
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however, of all corporate spending; the corporation's resources
for that spending are the result of the corporation's economic
success. One could argue analogously that "Pepsi" should be
restricted to spending less money on advertising than "Coke,"
regardless of the companies' respective economic health, because
consumers prefer Coke. 0 More importantly, why is the Court
imposing a requirement that a corporation have the ideological
support of its customers? A corporation is a separate legal entity
and does not purport to speak on behalf of its customers, or even
for its stockholders or employees.2' If, as discussed above, a
corporation as an entity can make a meaningful contribution to
the marketplace of ideas by spending money on political issues
that are of interest to it, nothing in law or logic requires that
the various constituencies with which the corporation deals sup-
port its views. The only limitation on the speech should be the
requirement of a sufficient nexus between a corporation's legiti-
mate objectives, such as profitmaking, and its political expendi-
tures. As discussed below, however, the absence of such a nexus
would subject the expenditure to attack under principles of
corporate law.
Indeed, this nexus refutes the Court's suggestion that corpo-
rate political speech presents a tool for management abuse-
specifically, management's use of corporate funds to further per-
220. See Nichol, supra note 84, at 329 ("Can the McDonald's advertising budget be
checked in order to afford equal economic opportunity to a mom and pop diner?").
Moreover, as Dean Nichol states, "[lf wealth is not 'germane' to participation in politics,
what goes for organizations should go for individuals as well." Id. at 327.
221. The Court's statement raises another problem: What about speech that one
corporate constituency supports but to which another objects? In the controversy over
AT&T's charitable donations to Planned Parenthood, for example, AT&T decided to cease
making the $50,000 annual donation because of customer complaints, in spite of the fact
that stockholders overwhelmingly defeated a proposal forbidding such donations. See
Keppel, AT&T Holders Take Stand on Abortion Issue, L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at D2,
col. 3. Several large stockholders, including the Trustees of the New York City Employees'
Retirement System, a holder of three million shares of AT&T stock, objected vocally to
the company's decision. See Buder, Large Pension Fund Criticizes A.T.&T. Over Family
Agency, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1990, at B3, col. 1.
222. Scholars have seriously questioned the effectiveness of corporate law methods of
disciplining management. See infra notes 259-63. In addition, the business judgment rule
prevents stockholders from obtaining judicial redress for many violations of management's
duty of care. See, e.g., Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983).
Professor Cohn observed that although successful derivative suits for simple negligence
are rare, the derivative suit is a much more effective monitor of management behavior
in cases involving fraud, self-dealing, conflicts of interest, or violations of the federal
securities laws. Id. at 596.
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sonal political objectives.m An investment in a corporation in-
volves a degree of delegation of authority; the stockholders
delegate to management by contract the power to make business
decisions. So long as the corporation's political expenditures do
not leave the realm of appropriate business decisions, they are
within the scope of management's delegated authority.2 If man-
agement abuses that delegation and begins acting in its own self-
interest, stockholders have available all of the standard remedies
of corporate governance, including the election process and the
derivative suit.
In sum, the rationale for the Court's holding that corporate
speech presents a threat of corruption boils down to a determi-
nation that eliminating corporate speech will tend to level the
playing field, making political speech "fairer" for the individual.
The first amendment directly forbids the legislature from acting
as the judge of how to make speech more fair.2 Moreover, if
223. Note that such allegations would not necessarily take this situation out of the
purview of the business judgment rule. In cases in which management acts with a mixture
of permissible and impermissible motives, the business judgment rule will apply unless
the impermissible motives predominate. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
224. The comparison is often made between corporate political spending and corporate
charitable contributions. See, e.g., Note, Corporate Speech on Political Issues: The First
Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals?, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 458-59. Whereas
a certain similarity exists between the two in that stockholders may also find charitable
spending objectionable as a waste of corporate funds or as contrary to their personal
views, charitable contributions have a far more tenuous link to corporate profits than
does political spending. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)) (suggesting that tax deductions for
corporate charitable donations would be allowed only for donations that do not result
from the "'incentive of anticipated benefit' of an economic nature"). As one commentator
observed, a strict application of this test would permit a tax deduction only for corporate
charitable donations that constitute a breach of management's fiduciary duties. Note,
Corporate Charitable Contributions: Expanding the Judicial Analysis in a Post-Economic
Recovery Act World, 58 IND. L.J. 161, 174 n.97 (1982). Yet charitable spending is allowed,
generally without objection. Cf. supra note 83 (citing cases involving challenges to
charitable contributions). Furthermore, as Justice Scalia noted, stockholders in a com-
mercial corporation are unlikely to be surprised by corporate action that is contrary to
their personal ideologies, although members of a nonprofit corporation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union may well find certain political activity by the association
objectionable. See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1412
(1990) (Scalla, J., dissenting).
225. Consider the implications of accepting the rationale that legislation will promote
fairness of speech as a sufficiently compelling interest to justify infringement of protected
speech. A legislature could determine that political speech is "unfair" when spoken by
those who have a financial interest in the election results. Incumbents could find that
campaign speech by challengers during an election contest is often filled with distortions
and inaccuracies and could ban such speech as unfair. Indeed, the promulgation of laws
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fairness were an acceptable basis for restricting protected speech,
the legislature could simply ban all political speech. Regulations
that attempt to value speech and reject certain speech as less
valuable are directly antithetical to the first amendment.
B. Is The Regulation Narrowly Tailored?
The Court's decision in Austin was based on principles of
constitutional rather than corporate law. In considering whether
Michigan sufficiently narrowly tailored its regulation, the Court
did not find it necessary to consider the attributes of the cor-
porate form. This is a major shortcoming in the Austin opinion.
One cannot consider regulation of corporate political speech in
isolation when, unlike individuals, corporations are subject to a
pervasive general system of regulation: state corporation law.226
Unlike many less formal groups and associations, such as part-
nerships, the corporation is created by an affirmative act of the
state. A certificate of incorporation must be filed with the Sec-
retary of State before the special attributes of the corporate
form are secured. Moreover, the formation of a corporation in-
cludes the corporation's explicit agreement to be subject to state
corporation law, a body of regulation that may specify a corpo-
ration's powers and obligations, set forth certain formal requisites
for corporate action, and regulate corporate activities that impact
the state. In return for a corporation's agreement to subject itself
to this body of regulation, which agreement is evidenced by the
act of incorporating under that state's laws, state law gives a
corporation certain attributes, includiig limited liability for the
corporation's stockholders, perpetual duration, the capacity to
sue and to be sued in the corporate name, free transferability of
restricting corporate political expenditures has the effect of removing one of the only
classes of speakers able to compete effectively with the government in referenda and
with incumbents in election contests. See M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS,
LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 156 (1983) ("There is the danger that the
prestige and status of government will give its utterances an advantage in competition
with private-sector communications."). Perhaps this effect accounts, in part, for the
popularity of campaign finance reform among legislators.
226. Substantial commentary exists on whether and to what extent the system of
corporate law functions effectively to monitor management and further the interests of
stockholders. See infra notes 259-63. This Article is cognizant that the effectiveness of
corporate law may be imperfect and suggests not that state corporate law is a panacea,
but that it is a fundamental starting point in assessing the validity of statutes addressed
to corporate conduct. Because the Court's opinion in Austin is bereft of any analysis of
the corporate law framework, the Court has failed to conduct the kind of exacting scrutiny
that a prohibition on speech mandates.
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ownership interests, and treatment as a separate entity for tax
purposes.22
In order to appreciate state regulation of the corporate form,
it is necessary to consider two separate aspects of this regulation:
the corporation law limitations on corporate conduct and the
special benefits of the corporate form. The special benefits of the
corporate form are the attributes of "corporateness" upon which
227. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, SS 73-76, at 130-38. State corporation law
provides the source for corporate creation, yet it typically does not enumerate the full
range of rights and powers that a corporation possesses after formation. This principle
has its roots in the historic case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), which held that the State of New Hampshire's revocation of a
corporate charter violated the contracts clause of article I of the federal Constitution. Id.
at 712.
Scholars have articulated numerous theories that attempt to describe the corporate
entity. These include the "personhood" theory, which views the corporation as a natural
entity with an existence and rights separate from its shareholders and other constitu-
encies; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as an artificial creation
of the state subject to state-imposed limitations; the trust theory, which analogizes the
managers of a corporation to trustees and the shareholders to beneficiaries; and the
description of a corporation as a nexus of contracts between management, stockholders,
employees, and other constituencies. See, e.g., Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Ap-
proach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1449
(1989) (describing trust theory and nexus of contracts theory); Mark, The Personification
of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441 (1987) (discussing
development of different conceptions of the corporation as association, artificial person,
and "organist real person/real entity"). The development of these descriptive theories is
not solely an academic exercise. The treatment of the corporation under the law, whether
statutory, common, or constitutional, is dependent in large part on its proper character-
ization. See Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989) (implications of the different models for
judicial behavior).
For example, courts have struggled for over a century with the question of how
properly to characterize a corporation for purposes of the federal Constitution. The
Supreme Court first declared the corporation a person for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
This personhood view of the corporation has enjoyed general acceptance in judicial
decisions, and the Court subsequently has held that corporations have protected liberty
and property interests under the fourteenth amendment, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 778-79 (1978), privacy interests under the fourth amendment, G.M. Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977), double jeopardy and due process rights under
the fifth amendment, Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Noble v. Union
River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893), and the right to a jury trial, Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 543 (1970). Virtually the only constitutional protection that the
Court has denied corporations is the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 51 (1906).
The Court has also denied corporations the privileges of citizens under the privileges
and immunities clause. See Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1945). For
a detailed discussion of the application of Bill of Rights protections to corporations, see
generally Mayer, supra note 73.
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the Court justifies its distinctive treatment of corporate political
speech.m Within these special benefits, the attribute of limited
liability traditionally receives the most attention. Commentators
have defined limited liability as "the rule that shareholders are
not liable for the obligations of the corporation beyond their
capital investment." Limited liability is the characteristic pri-
marily responsible for the prevalence of the corporate form
among large United States businesses and the characteristic to
which commentators have attributed the success of United States
business.20 It permits those wishing to invest in a corporation
to limit their exposure to the amount of their investment. For
example, an individual can purchase one hundred shares of Exxon
stock secure in the knowledge that even if Exxon causes an
enormous oil spill which results in millions of dollars of liability,
the individual cannot lose more than the amount of his initial
investment. Corporations thus allow investors to participate in
the earnings of a business without being personally responsible
for the consequences of failure, an attribute that makes it easier
to raise equity capital through use of the corporate form. Not
surprisingly, this attribute makes the corporation the vehicle of
choice for many businesses of substantial size.231
Although limited liability is a valuable attribute of the corpo-
rate form, one should not overestimate its importance. Limited
partnerships provide the same shelter for the assets of their
passive investors and provide favorable tax treatment as well., 2
Moreover, although limited liability protects the stockholder/
investor, it does not shield the conduct of the corporate control-
lers, such as its officers and directors, from the threat of personal
liabflity.m Most importantly, limited liability does not offer any
sort of government subsidy to the corporation's business. The
228. See Baldwin & Karpay, Corporate Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. S 441b and the
Superior Rights of Natural Persons, 14 PAC. L.J. 209, 240 n.218 (1983) (special benefits of
the corporate form include "the privilege of limited liability, perpetual existence, use of
the corporate name to sue and be sued, and potential tax advantages for shareholders").
229. P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, SUBSTANTIVE LAW 5 1.02, at 7
(1987).
230. Id. at 7-8.
231. For a detailed analysis of the theoretical and economic advantages and disadvan-
tages of limited liability to the business enterprise, see id. SS 4.01-5.02, at 63-101.
232. The State of Michigan, for example, permits investors to limit their liability in
the same manner as corporate shareholders through the use of a limited partnership.
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. SS 449.1108, 449.1301a (West 1989).
233. Limited partners in Michigan, like shareholders, have the right to bring derivative
suits. Id. 5 449.2001.
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corporation itself, as actor, does not share the shield of limited
liability and is responsible for the full extent of any debts and
obligations it incurs.m For corporations with substantial assets,
therefore, limited shareholder liability is unlikely to have a sub-
stantial impact on corporate decisionmaking.
Nor, upon reexamination, do the other attributes of the cor-
porate form suggest a particularly favored legal status. Corpo-
rations do, by virtue of state law, enjoy perpetual life and do
not dissolve automatically upon the death of a partner or founder,
but businesses that do not operate in the corporate form can
achieve the same permanence by contract. Similarly, although
corporations often are distinguished from other forms of busi-
nesses by the fact that equity interests- shares of stock-are
freely transferable in the corporation, the partnership form can
likewise achieve such flexibility through contractual provisions.
Indeed, limited partnership interests generally are considered to
be securities 235 and often are quoted and traded in much the
same manner as stocks.
The ability to sue. and to be sued in the corporate name results
in judicial recognition of the corporation as an entity. Although
useful in that it would be difficult and burdensome for a business
with many diverse owners to deal with joinder issues, the class
action lawsuit and other procedural devices would enable a cor-
poration to obtain recourse in the courts without this attribute.
And of course, judicial recognition of the corporate form does
not substantially affect the corporation's ability to function as an
economic unit.
Finally, separate taxation of the corporation as an entity can
be either a benefit or a detriment to the business organized in
the corporate form. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code recognizes
that taxation as a corporation is often a burden for small cor-
porations and provides such businesses with the option of being
taxed as a partnership through election of subchapter S status.23
234. Commentators who wish to present the view of corporations as powerful yet
unaccountable frequently ignore this aspect of limited liability. See, e.g., Mayer, supra
note 73, at 658-59. Professor Mayer states that "corporations enjoy limited liability for
industrial accidents such as nuclear power disasters," omitting the explanation that the
only individuals shielded from that liability are the stockholders. Id. at 658. Neither the
employees who negligently cause such accidents to occur, the management whose lax
supervision permits the accident, nor the corporation itself receives any special treatment
with respect to their liability for the accident, despite the corporate form.
235. See, e.g., People v. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 1164-65, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322
(1985).
236. See 26 U.S.C. SS 1361-1363 (1988).
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Apparently the primary significance of the corporate form is
not its special legal attributes; the dichotomy between the cor-
poration and the partnership or alternative business form tends
to be overstated. Rather, the distinctive attribute of the corporate
form, particularly for large, publicly held corporations, is its
organizational structure: the separation in a true corporation of
ownership from management.2 Unlike the partnership or sole
proprietorship, the owners of a corporation, the stockholders, are
not responsible for managing the corporation; they elect directors
who in turn select a corporation's management, its officers. The
stockholders' elected agents make the decisions that normally
would be made by owners, such as what products to sell, whom
to employ, and what type of advertising to purchase.m This
separation of ownership and responsibility for day-to-day deci-
sions is, in reality, the main attribute distinguishing the large,
publicly held corporation from other forms of business.239
Because hired agents rather than owners of large corporations
carry on corporate management, state corporation law provides
limitations on the activities of those agents. The most important
of these limitations is the corporate charter. The charter is often
237. Commentators also refer to this attribute as the "separation of ownership and
control." Scholars have blamed the separation of ownership and control for many of the
evils associated with the corporate form. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967); R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN,
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 1684
(discussing implications of the Berle & Means theory and, in particular, the effect that
separation of ownership and control has on the presumption that corporations are profit
maximizers).
Unlike limited liability, the separation-of ownership and control is not an attribute
common to all corporations. Corporations with few stockholders, in which the stockholders
also participate in the corporation's business as management, directors, and employees,
lack this characteristic. Such corporations, known as close corporations, present an
organizational structure more nearly analogous to that of an unincorporated business
entity, such as a partnership. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, § 257, at 694-97.
238. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980);
see Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1758-63 (1989) (discussing principallagent theory of corporate law and transaction costs
imposed by using and monitoring agents).
239. Delegating corporate control to management results in a certain inherent conflict
of interest. No matter how responsive management is to the needs of the corporation's
stockholders, management views will not reflect those of stockholders on many issues
due to fundamental economic differences in their relative positions. For example, man-
agement and stockholders are in direct conflict with respect to management compensation,
antitakeover charter provisions, and many other areas. For a detailed discussion of the
conflict engendered by the separation of ownership and control and a proposed solution,
see Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis.
L. REV. 881, 886-92.
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characterized as a contract between the stockholders and man-
agement; it is, in essence, the contract for that agency relation-
ship.240 Through the corporate charter, stockholders can prevent
management from taking certain actions, require actions to be
subject to stockholder vote, and affect management's accounta-
bility to the corporation. 241
A second, although less significant, limitation is the state
corporation law. At one time corporation law was a substantial
constraint on corporate activity. Corporations were limited by
statute in size and duration. In addition, corporations could en-
gage only in activities that state law authorized. Today, corpo-
ration law is generally permissive in nature, providing some
minimal constraints by deeming some charter provisions contrary
to public policy and by requiring stockholder votes for important
corporate activities such as merger or dissolution. State corpo-
ration law, however, does impose certain duties upon manage-
ment: management's fiduciary duty. Both the common law and
state corporation law statutes require that management exercise
a fiduciary standard of care;242 that is, management must act in
good faith and with that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent
person would use under similar circumstances. 243 In addition,
statutes specify that in taking action, management must consider
the interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 244
Advocates of a more intrusive system of statutory regulation
argue that the contract theory of corporations is inadequate
because corporations have an effect on third parties whose rights
will not be protected by the contractual charter between stock-
holders and the company2' These advocates suggest that a more
rigorous body of state incorporation law is necessary to guard
against perceived corporate "evils." This approach has not gained
240. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, S 122, at 279-82.
241. For example, statutes such as DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1988) allow
stockholders to release directors from personal liability for violating their duty of care
to the corporation.
242. The common law fiduciary duty that corporate management owes to the corpo-
ration's stockholders is based on principles of agency law. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 19-37, 118 (4th
ed. 1990).
243. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW SS 715(h), 717(a) (McKinney 1986).
244. See, e.g., id. § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
245. See, e.g., Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1549, 1549-55 (1989); cf. Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1615-17 (1989) (contract theory of
corporation is also inadequate because of the corporation's power to amend its corporate
charter).
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acceptance in the states, in large part because of the so-called
"race for the bottom," a term coined by Professor William Cary26
to describe state legislatures' proclivity to make their corporation
statutes increasingly lax and permissive in an attempt to en-
courage more corporations to incorporate in the state.247
The third limitation on corporate managerial conduct is the
common law doctrine of fiduciary duty. The common law and
case development both explain and supplement the statutory
concept of fiduciary duty. Under the prevailing cases, manage-
ment has a duty to remain informed, to run the corporation in a
prudent manner, and, in so doing, to act in the best interests of
the corporation, free from personal motives, self-dealing, and
neglect.m Management has a duty to act lawfully249 and an
obligation not to enrich itself at the corporation's expense. 250 Such
doctrines as fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, the duty to act
lawfully, and the doctrine of waste have their source in common
law limitations on management actions.251
What implications does the separation of ownership and control
have for the regulation of corporate political speech?
C. Better Alternatives
The preexistence of a system of corporate regulation suggests
that, in order to ascertain whether statutes such as FECA are
246. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 666 (1974). The phenomenon observed by Professor Cary was first described by
Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933),
in which he described the competition between states for corporate charters as a race
"of laxity:' For a description of the development of the term and a compendium of
adherents to the principle it reflects, see Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 469 n.1 (1987).
247. The race for the bottom is generally attributed to interstate competition for
corporate franchise taxes. See Macey & Miller, supra note 246, at 470. The relatively
small State of Delaware has, through the attractiveness of its corporation laws, become
the state of incorporation for many major United States businesses. See id. at 478 (43%
of New York Stock Exchange firms are incorporated in Delaware). Delaware pays for
16% of its annual budget through corporate franchise taxes. Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1506 n.206 (1989) (citing UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOV'T FINANCES-STATE GOV'T FINANCES IN 1987,
at 12 (1988)); see Cary, supra note 246, at 684 ("Perhaps there is no public policy left in
Delaware corporate law except the objective of raising revenue.").
248. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 895 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985); Francis v. United Jersey
Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 32, 432 A.2d'814, 822 (1981).
249. E.g., Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
250. E.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 272-73, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (1939).
251. E.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S 524, 529 (1920).
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narrowly tailored to meet the governmental interest involved,
the Court should determine if the evils reputedly presented by
corporate political speech can be regulated by traditional corpo-
rate law. In other words, is an alternative method of regulating
corporate political speech equally effective without intruding so
deeply on first amendment values?
1. Fiduciary Duty Law
Before endorsing a statutory restriction on corporate political
speech, one should understand what restrictions already exist by
virtue of common law limitations on management's actions. 52 The
common law provides several important restrictions on corporate
political speech that the Court seemed to overlook in Austin.
First, management cannot spend corporate funds on political
issues that further its political objectives rather than those of
the corporation. 25 Such spending constitutes self-dealing and
waste, and the corporation's stockholders have a cause of action
in the name of the corporation to recover amounts wrongfully
spent.24 Second, management cannot cause the corporation to
engage in political speech unless management believes in good
faith that such speech will further the corporation's interests.
The relationship between the expenditure and the corporation's
overall benefit need not be direct; indeed, corporations have long
made charitable contributions based on the theory that corporate
252. The common law has been supplemented in name, although probably not in effect,
by statutory provisions enacting a standard of due care, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE S 309(a)
(West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 717 (McKinney 1990), or setting forth procedures to
be followed when a director has a possible conflict of interest, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, S 144 (1988). Whether these provisions add anything to the common law principles
from which they are derived is unclear. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-
04 (Del. 1987).
253. The distinction between spending that furthers the corporation's interests and
waste is not always obvious. For a discussion of the legal principles applicable to the
doctrine of waste and the inherent difficulty in applying these principles to comparable
subjects, such as executive compensation, see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 182,
at 604-32. Courts generally consider as valid expenditures that further any legitimate
corporate objective, even if motivated by personal reasons. The difficulty in distilling
from any corporate political spending management's personal motives lends support to
Professor Brudney's position that corporate political spending is generally wasteful and
therefore that state law may constitutionally restrict it. See Brudney, supra note 82, at
256-65.
254. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) ("minority stockholders
generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate
disbursements alleged to have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to
further the personal interests of management").
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social responsibility provides an intangible benefit to the corpo-
ration, through enhanced reputation or such.2 5 Nonetheless, such
a relationship must exist; otherwise, courts consider the expen-
diture a waste of corporate assets and deem it wrongful, render-
ing management personally liable.256 Third, management must
pursue, as its primary objective, the achievement of corporate
profits.25 7 Although various statutory amendments have expanded
the scope of interests that management may consider in making
decisions to include employees, suppliers, and community inter-
ests,m management that fails to place the needs of the stock-
holders first 2 9 will, in the long run, find itself voted out of office. 20Two distinct mechanisms, the derivative suit and the stock-
holder vote, enforce the common law limitations on management
conduct. The literature on 'the effectiveness of both as tools for
enforcing compliance with management's duties to the corpora-
255. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 182, at 115-30 (tracing the development
of statutory provisions relating to charitable contributions and examining relation of such
contributions to corporate welfare).
256. See, e.g., H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, 5 234, at 622-23. This is true
even if a majority of the stockholders consent to the wasteful action; see Brudney, supra
note 82, at 244 n.40 (citing cases).
257. See, e.g., AMERIcAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE S 2.01 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1984) ("A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain . . ").
258. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 717(b) (McKinney 1990); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 511(B)
(1988).
259. The extent to which corporations consider social policy and choose goals that favor
social responsibility at the expense of corporate profits remains an area of debate. See
generally Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1979) (suggesting that the pursuit of social ends at the expense of corporate profits is
socially undesirable, except in certain specified areas); Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and
Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1287, 1288 (1979) (asserting that "corporate managers [should] take account of the
total consequences of their decisions in determining company policies and practices");
Rappaport, Let's Let Business Be Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, S 3, at 13, col. 2
(arguing that corporate participation is an inefficient way to solve social problems and
that the corporation's only social responsibility should be to increase its value to "stake-
holders").
260. Commentators have termed the mechanism that supposedly aligns the interests
of stockholders and management "the market for corporate control." See Eisenberg, supra
note 247, at 1497-99. They claim that this market addresses concerns about management
wrongdoing or inefficiency by functioning in such a way that managers who do not
perform satisfactorily are replaced. Commentators are divided, however, as to whether
the market for corporate control actually functions successfully. See, e.g., Coffee, Regu-
lating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role
in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161, 1173-82 (1981); Herman, The Limits of the Market as a Discipline in Corporate
Governance, 9 DEsL. J. CORP. L. 530 (1984).
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tion is extensive, and this Article will not review it in detail.261
Suffice it to say that an ample body of scholarship takes the
position that stockholders' tools for disciplining their agents are,
in large part, ineffective.262 The combination of stockholder apa-
thy, inability of small stockholders to communicate and coordinate
with one another, lack of access to full information, and proce-
dural hurdles to stockholder derivative suits263 permits manage-
ment to undertake many objectionable activities with impunity.
These tools would work better if corporate political speech
were sufficiently visible. One substantial limitation on a stock-
holder's ability to discipline his or her managers is the inability
to discover what kind of political expenditures the corporation
is making and in what amount. A modest addition to the federal
securities laws could readily address this problem on the federal
level. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934214 and the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules thereunder 265 require large,
publicly held companies to disclose certain information about their
261. For a sampling of the literature addressing the derivative suit, see Fischel &
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 262 n.2 (1986). For scholarship dealing
with the effectiveness of shareholder voting and access to the proxy machinery, see Ryan,
Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv.
97, 99 n.8 (1988).
262. See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, supra note 261, at 292 ("Many analyses of corporate
law assume that liability rules enforced by derivative suits play a fundamental role in
aligning the interests of managers and investors. We have shown that this widespread
assumption is not supported by either the theory of liability rules, the available empirical
evidence, or the structure of corporate law."); Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the
Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 136 (1987) ("In most
cases, the collective action problem faced by dispersed shareholders renders voting
relatively ineffective as a monitoring 'mechanism."); Exchange Act Release No. 34-24623,
52 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (June 22, 1987) (Commission recognizes that the "collective action"
limitations on shareholder voting make voting an ineffective tool for shareholders to
resist management proposals); see also Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 264-
65 (1981) (discussing the impairment of shareholders' mechanisms for enforcing corporate
accountability); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
395-97 (1983) (comparing assertions that shareholders should take back their lost control
over the decisionmaking process with contentions that shareholders do not have the
ability to govern); Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REv.
1489, 1490 (1970) (suggesting that managers rather than shareholders control corporate
actions).
263. Procedural hurdles to shareholder derivative- suits include the requirements of
contemporaneous ownership, a demand on the board, and the posting of security for
expenses. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, S 362, 365, at 1058-65, 1069-70.
264. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. SS 78a-7811 (1988).
265. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 5S
240.0-1 to .31-1 (1990).
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annual operations to the SEC and to shareholders. 266 Congress
or the SEC could amend the disclosure requirements to mandate
specific disclosure of all corporate political expenditures. 26 7
Providing a disclosure mechanism within the federal securities
laws has several advantages over the current system of regula-
tion. The first advantage is that the disclosure remedy is tied
more precisely to the situations in which corporate political
speech represents a potential threat. Political speech by small
businesses organized as close corporations is not, as we have
discussed, materially different from speech by partnerships, sole
proprietorships, or other businesses that do not utilize the cor-
porate form.268 The potential danger in corporate speech comes
at the level at which a substantial separation of ownership and
management exists. The danger is aggravated at the level of the
large, publicly held corporation in which the tools designed to
monitor and discipline management function imperfectly Because
the securities laws require disclosure from precisely these cor-
porations, the suggested provision will enable regulation of the
potential harm without burdening small entities that do not
present analogous risks.
Second, disclosure will render management more accountable
in the area of political expenditures by making corporate political
speech more visible to stockholders and the public. Increased
visibility will enable market forces governing corporations to
function more efficiently. Among these forces is the market for
stock prices. If a corporation spends a large amount of money'to
influence elections, rather than on salaries, research and devel-
opment, and raw materials, Wall Street is likely to view it with
suspicion. The market thus will join with Congress in discour-
aging expenditures that are not socially valuable. Disclosure and
266. Large, publicly held compames are required to register under S 12 of the Exchange
Act. 15 U.S.C. S 781 (1988). Section 13 requires registered issuers to file periodical reports
with the SEC. I& § 78m; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-i to -17 (1990). SEC rules prohibit such
issuers from soliciting proxies for the election of directors unless the issuer has distributed
an annual report to stockholders. See zl. S 240.14a-3.
267. This Article takes the position that the required disclosure should include the
amount of corporate political expenditures, the medium m which such expenditures were
made (such as television or distribution of letters), and the specific candidates to whom
the expenditures related. Although disclosure of specific candidates' names may engender
adverse publicity for the candidates, it is the most effective way of bringing home to
stockholders the nature of the corporate political speech and of enabling stockholders to
control speech with which they disagree through the corporate process.
268. Nor is political speech by large corporations different in kind from speech by
large umncorporated businesses.
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its attendant visibility also are likely to have a direct impact on
management conduct. Requiring management to disclose expend-
itures to stockholders and to the investing public is generally
viewed as deterring irresponsible or excessive expenditures; the
mere element of accountability improves management perform-
ance by discouraging such conduct.
Third, accounting for political expenditures through the federal
system of periodic disclosure provides stockholders with infor-
mation on expenditures in connection with their proxy materials,
encouraging stockholders to monitor their corporation's speech
more directly by choosing not to reelect those directors who
permit excessive or unpopular political expenditures. Tying dis-
closure to the federal proxy process results in a system that
encourages management's political expenditures to be responsive
to stockholder opinion.26 9
2. State Corporation Law Statutes
If a direct statutory restriction on corporate political speech
is necessary, the obvious alternative to a regulation like FECA
is the alternative indirectly referenced in Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Bellotti: state corporation statutes that limit or regulate
corporate political speech.20 As Rehnquist observed, because such
statutes are the constitutive instruments for the artificial entity
that is a corporation, limitations on corporate speech in those
statutes have an added legitimacy.Y1 Although even an outright
ban on corporate speech might be legitimate under a state cor-
poration statute, legislatures are unlikely to implement such a
ban because modern state corporation laws have failed to serve
as significant regulatory tools due to the race to the bottom and
the acceptance by state legislators of the lure of flexibility over
the sword of Damocles. Expecting states to utilize state corpo-
269. Increased disclosure may be particularly effective at a time when stockholders
are taking an increasingly active role in monitoring and attempting to influence the social
policy of their corporations. See, e.g., Shareholder activism replacing divestment as social
tool, METAL WEEK, Apr. 16, 1990, at 3 (describing shareholder resolutions on issues
including abortion, pollution, and South Africa); Staff Acts on Shareholder Proposals on
Directors, Stock Buybacks, Charities, [Jan-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 212-13
(Feb. 15, 1991) (describing various shareholder proposals for spring 1991 annual meetings,
including proposals about corporate charitable contributions, election of directors, and
director stock ownership).
270. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822-28 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
271. See id. at 823-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ration law as a check on corporate political speech is thus not
reasonable. At best, a statutory provision might require or ex-
pressly permit corporate charter provisions to deal with the issue
of political expenditures.
3. Charter Promssons
A third way to handle corporate political speech is through
the charter as corporate contract. Scholars have recently come
to view the corporate contract as a far more potent tool for
addressing issues of corporation law and policy.272 This view is
premised on the perception that a corporation is based on con-
sensual relationships between investors, managers, and employ-
ees and that the terms of the agreements between these
constituencies should govern the corporation. For example, if
stockholders decide that they will not hold the directors whom
they elect personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duty to
the corporation, that decision is within the province of the stock-
holders and, assuming they make it on an informed basis and
without any procedural deficiencies, statutory law should not
deem it invalid.23
The justification for allowing this freedom of contract is the
notion that contractual provisions that are not socially and eco-
nomically efficient will not endure in a market economy.274 If it
thus turns out that a contractual provision like the one described
above harms the corporation by causing directors to act carelessly
and irresponsibly, the corporation will be at a competitive dis-
advantage to similar companies without that provision. The cor-
poration's value, and ultimately its stock price, will suffer.
Accordingly, the harmful effect on their investment will discour-
age stockholders from entering into such contractual provisions. 275
The contract theory of corporate law suggests an alternative
approach to dealing with the perceived problems of corporate
political speech. State corporation statutes could require corpo-
rations to address the political expenditures issue explicitly in
272. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416
(1989).
273. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 102(b)(7) (1988).
274. See Easterbrook & Fischel, sulfra note 272, at 1428-34 (discussing the mechamsm
by wich the terms of corporate governance affect the stock price).
275. Cf. Gordon, supra note 245, at 1554-85 (arguing that full contractual freedom in
corporate law will not necessarily lead to wealth maximization and that some mandatory
legal rules are needed to limit corporate behavior).
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their charters. For example, statutes could permit corporations
to engage in political speech only if they have a charter provision
that expressly authorizes such speech. The charter provision
might limit the total amount the corporation could spend on
political speech or the amount spent on any single candidate or
issue. 76 In the alternative, the provision might require that all
corporate political speech be authorized by stockholder vote. A
corporation's management would thus have to submit to the
stockholders any proposed expenditure in favor of a political
candidate.
Charter provisions offer several advantages over direct regu-
lation of corporate political speech. First, they do not result in
state interference with constitutionally protected speech. Any
limitations imposed on a corporation's speech are imposed by the
corporation itself; they are a decision by the potential speaker
not to speak. Second, charter provisions deal specifically with
the potential for dianagement abuse. Stockholders who are con-
cerned that management will waste corporate funds on political
expenditures can limit such expenditures or require their sub-
mission for stockholder approval. Third, charter provisions ad-
dress the Court's concern in Austin that political speech be
publicly supported. Stockholders must either approve the political
expenditure directly or, by expressly delegating to management
the authority to make political expenditures, indirectly.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began by recognizing the widespread perception
that corporations are evil and that corporate political speech is
still viler. Although it questions some of the foundations upon
which that perception is based, this Article did not attempt to
rebut that view. Nor did it attempt to justify corporate political
speech based on the conception of the corporation as person or
citizen. Based instead on the premise that corporate political
speech, like other political speech, furthers first amendment
values such as free trade in the marketplace of ideas, this Article
questioned whether an outright prohibition of corporate political
speech in connection with candidate elections is justified or
necessary. In particular, it asked whether the Supreme Court
can legitimately uphold such prohibitions without considering the
276. The provisions could contain an absolute dollar limitation or a limitation based on
a percentage of earnings.
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availability of other, less intrusive methods of regulating corpo-
rate political speech.
A review of the Court's analysis in Austsn compels the conclu-
sion that the Court's perception of the potential evil arising from
corporate political speech is overstated. Moreover, based on the
strict scrutiny with which the Court must examine the prohibi-
tion, the potential evil does not justify the ban. Rather, traditional
corporation law offers a multitude of less intrusive methods for
dealing with the corrosive effect of corporate speech, and the
first amendment compels the Court to consider those alternatives.
